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2Abstract
This paper makes a significant contribution on both conceptual and methodological
fronts, in the analysis of the effect of maternal autonomy on school enrolment age of
children in India. The school entry age is modelled using a discrete time duration model
where maternal autonomy is entered as a latent characteristic, and allowed to be
associated with various parental and household characteristics which also conditionally
affect school entry age. The model identification is achieved by using proxy measures
collected in the third round of the National Family Health Survey of India, on
information relating to the economic, decision-making, physical and emotional
autonomy of a woman. We concentrate on three very different states in India – Andhra
Pradesh, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. Our results indicate that female autonomy is not
associated with socio-economic characteristics of the woman or her family in Kerala
(except maternal education), while it is strongly correlated to these characteristics in
both Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. Secondly, while female autonomy is
significant in influencing the school starting age in UP, it is less important in AP and
not significant at all in Kerala.
Keywords: Latent Factor Models; Structural Equation Models; Female Autonomy;
School Enrolment Decisions; India; National Family Health Survey.
JEL: I2, J12, C35
3Introduction
The vast literature on children’s education identifies a number of factors that influence
children’s educational inputs and outcomes including, for instance, parent’s education,
income levels, social norms and regional factors. One factor that has been considered
extensively in the context of other child welfare indicators, like health and child
mortality, but has been less extensively considered in the context of education is the
autonomy of women within the household. Academic researchers as well as policy
makers have long argued that female autonomy will help improve family welfare
because women are more altruistic in their decisions with regard to the family than men.
Intuitively, a woman’s autonomy is likely to affect the education of her children by
improving her bargaining power, her mobility and ability to collect and process
information regarding schooling and to act on this information. In this paper, we analyse
the impact of mother’s autonomy on children’s starting age in school in India.1
Although India has made impressive strides in improving its primary schooling record,
there is, however, still room for substantial improvement. Data from the UNICEF
(2009) suggest that an estimated 42 million children aged 6 to 10 are not in school. Our
analysis is based on the third round of the National Family Health Survey of India
(NFHS3).
The paper makes a significant contribution on both conceptual and
methodological fronts. It is innovative in the way in which it models child school entry
age as well as how female autonomy is conceptualised and treated in the model of
school entry. First, while most studies within the literature on education have
concentrated on enrolment and performance of children in school, in this paper, we
study the school starting age (SSA) which provides a new and interesting perspective.
To begin with, the SSA may be seen as an early indicator of the educational prospects
of the child because it encompasses considerable information relating to the interest
taken by parents in the child’s education, their priorities and the constraints they face. In
addition, different SSAs across children throw up a number of pedagogical challenges
since they imply that each class has children of different ages within it. Understanding
the factors that influence the SSA therefore is very important from a policy point of
view. Modelling this, however, is not very straightforward and the paper makes a
1 We use the terms female autonomy, mother’s autonomy and women’s autonomy to mean the same
thing in our context.
4methodological innovation by modelling ‘entry into school’ in the context of duration
analysis. This approach allows us to address two issues – right censoring of data and the
initial conditions problem - that affect all analyses of this kind. The data is right
censored because of the presence of school-age children who have still not started
school in the sample. The initial conditions problem, on the other hand, arises because
children of different ages at the time of interview would have become eligible for
school admission at different times.
The second significant contribution of this paper is in the way in which we treat
and model the impact of female autonomy on school enrolment age. Female autonomy
is an end in itself and also an instrument to help achieve household welfare objectives.
While some authors have used proxies like female education, employment and wealth,
others have used direct responses to questions relating to women’s freedom and
decision-making power. The latter group of writers has in turn varied in its approach,
both using summary indices of responses to these questions and using the responses
separately. The concept of autonomy itself is intrinsically vague and faces two main
problems in empirical work. First, variables like education which are often used to
capture female autonomy have both a direct effect on the outcome variable (like child
education, child health or household consumption) and also an indirect effect via
autonomy. Secondly, proxies that are often used to measure autonomy do not perfectly
capture this concept and produce equations with covariates that are correlated with the
equation error term resulting in endogeneity problems.
In this paper, we attempt to allow for these problems by modelling female
autonomy as a latent trait which cannot be directly measured. To do this, we use the
NFHS3 dataset, which provides detailed information about the level of autonomy
experienced by women across all states and Union Territories in India. We assume that
the direct responses to questions relating to economic, decision-making, physical and
emotional autonomy of a woman provide only a proxy measure. In addition, we allow
the latent autonomy trait to be correlated with a number of socio-economic factors
pertaining to the woman herself, her partner and the household she lives in. The
approach used here is borrowed from the ‘Item Response Theory’ which is routinely
used in socio-psychometric studies (Zheng and Rabe-Hesketh, 2007; DeBoeck and
5Wilson, 2004; for instance).2 This methodology improves on past studies in two
significant ways. First, it allows us to separate the direct effects of important covariates
in the model from their indirect effects, which work through the impact of these factors
on female autonomy. Second, our approach allows us to deal with the possible
endogeneity of these covariates in the model, due to their correlation with unobservable
factors such as autonomy.
We present within-state analysis for three contrasting states in India – Kerala (a
progressive, relatively developed state), Andhra Pradesh (one of India’s Southern states,
often considered to be the median state in India) and Uttar Pradesh (a North Indian state
which is traditionally seen as having relatively low levels of female autonomy) (Dreze
and Sen, 1996). We also compare our results across states in an attempt to consider how
patterns vary.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 lays out the research questions
motivating the present analysis. Section 2 describes the issues connected to primary
education in India and Section 3 explains the concepts and issues of female autonomy.
Section 4 describes the data, measurements and summary statistics. The econometric
methodology is laid out in Section 5, the results of which are outlined in Section 6.
Section 7 discusses the implications and concludes.
1. Research Questions
This paper concentrates on two main questions – what role does mother’s autonomy
play in determining the school starting age and what factors are related to mother’s
autonomy in their turn?
The age at which children start school, has caused considerable debate in public
discourse (see Elder and Lubotsky, 2007; Cascio and Schanzenbach, 2007; Black et al.
(2008). This literature is of limited relevance for us because it covers relatively
developed countries where school enrolment ages vary only at the margin as a result of
children being born in different months of the same year. In many developing countries,
by contrast, the variation is considerable with starting ages varying by years (as we see
in Table 1) and some children never entering school. Such late enrolment delays the
2 Our approach is similar to the one used by previous studies scrutinising cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities (Hansen et al., 2004; Heckman et al., 2006; for instance) although there are some
fundamental differences which we point out later.
6accumulation of human capital and also decreases its expected lifetime amount. Angrist
and Krueger (1991), for instance, show that earlier enrolment increases lifetime
earnings. In such a context, the SSA could be considered as an early indicator of child
welfare and adult labour market performance. Both absence from school and the
possibility that children are working instead, have welfare implications for the child. In
addition, a child’s late start at school might be indicative of the time and money
constraints that its parents face as well as the priority they place on education.
The factors that influence the SSA and the impact that mother’s autonomy has
on it are the central issue dealt with in this paper. Female autonomy in our study, as in
many others, can be seen as the ability of women to be independent in four areas –
emotional, decision-making, physical and economic autonomy. Emotional autonomy
indicates how independent the woman feels from her husband while decision-making
autonomy measures the extent to which the woman is involved in the decision-making
process of the household. Physical autonomy denotes how much freedom the woman
has to move around and economic autonomy quantifies the woman's control over her
own finances.
Female autonomy might be expected to have an impact on the SSA because it
reflects the ability of the woman to make independent decisions. As indicated in the
introduction, we do not need to accept that mothers are more altruistic than fathers for
this impact to hold. Having two adults, both of whom are able to work effectively in the
interests of the child is likely to be more advantageous for the child than having a single
adult (with his/her attendant time and incentive constraints) responsible for its welfare.
Even when parents are aware of the importance of schooling and convinced about the
returns from education, they may not have the information or the logistical ability to do
all that is necessary to send children to school. Given the male bread-winner model that
is common in India, fathers rarely have the time or the inclination to obtain and process
information relating to schooling. While mothers within this system might have the
time, they may not have the freedom to interact with others, obtain information and act
on it if they live under very restrictive social norms that dictate what women can and
cannot do. The autonomy of mothers in this context can be crucial. Women with greater
autonomy have greater physical mobility and are better able to network freely and
obtain information about schools. They may also be able to act on this information
better than mothers who are very dependent because they are able to visit schools, speak
7with teachers, take children to/from schools, buy books etc. Both physical and decision-
making autonomy are important in this respect.
Finally, mothers with economic autonomy also have economic freedom and this
helps them to prioritise schooling, if they wish. On the other hand, female autonomy
might increase the mother’s employment and if this keeps her very busy, she might
prefer to put off child schooling for as long as possible. In this case, some aspects of
female autonomy would actually worsen the school starting age of children.
Before we empirically analyse the role of female autonomy on the SSA, we will
consider the institutional background for schooling in India next.
2. Primary Education in India
In India, the prescribed age of starting primary school is 6 years. For children aged 6-11
in our data at the time of the interview, the school starting age distribution by major
states, is given in Table 1. We can see that while a significant number of children start
school between 6 and 8 years, there is no single entry point into education in India. The
‘more developed’ states like Kerala have a smaller window in which children enter
school while for AP and UP, this window lasts from 6-8 years and 6-9 years
respectively. Thus, 97% of children at school started at the age of 6 in Kerala, the
corresponding figure for UP is 57% and for AP is 81%.
In India, children who start late begin at the beginning and enrol in Class 1. So,
it is possible that if children start school at different ages, then there will be children of
different ages in each class, making the task of educating them more challenging. In
2004-2005, 14% of children in primary school were not in the right age group (District
Information System for Education, 2008a). Similarly, an estimated 6% of children in
primary schools and 9% in upper primary schools in 2004-2005 were over-aged (DISE,
2008b). The presence of over-aged children in primary education has become a point of
political interest in India, making our analysis in this paper more policy relevant.
In the context of the Millennium Development Goals, India’s flagship education
programme, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, set itself the goal of achieving universal
elementary education by 2010. Enrolling out of school children, enforcing the school
starting age and improving school quality are all crucial in achieving this objective. One
of the achievements of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan programme was that by March 2007
898% of the rural population had a school within one kilometre.3 Amongst the three
states we consider in this paper, Kerala benefited from being in Phase I of the District
Primary Education Programme (DPEP), a precursor to the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan put
forward in 1993/4. Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Uttar Pradesh (UP) were covered in Phase
II of the programme begun in 1997/8.
Thanks to programmes like the DPEP and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, India's
primary schooling record has improved considerably with elementary enrolment
increasing by 3.2% per annum between 2000 and 2005. The net primary school
enrolment rate for boys was approximately 91% between 2005 and 2009 and
approximately 88% for girls (UNICEF, 2008). There is, however, still room for
improvement. According to the UNICEF (2010)4, for instance, an estimated 42 million
children aged 6 to 10 in India are still not attending school. Furthermore, gender
differences appear widespread, making an analysis of factors influencing schooling
crucial.
3. Female Autonomy: Concepts and Issues in the Literature
As indicated above, our main research question relates to the role played by female
autonomy in determining the age at which children enter school. The literature on the
interrelations between female autonomy and child education is relatively small (Basu
and Ray, 2002; Lancaster et al., 2006; Afridi, 2005; Durrant and Sathar, 2000; Smith
and Byron, 2005; and Aslam, 2007). However, the broader literature on autonomy has
much to contribute to our analysis in this paper. We will therefore situate the paper
within this broader literature.
Autonomy has been defined variously in the literature as ‘the ability to influence
and control one’s environment’ (Safilios-Rothschild, 1982), or the ‘capacity to obtain
information and make decisions about one’s private concerns and those of one’s
intimates’ (Dyson and Moore, 1983). Dixon-Mueller (1978) defines it as ‘the degree of
access to and control over material and social resources within the family, in the
community and in the society at large’. The term autonomy has often been confused
with empowerment, though the latter is a process and the former is the outcome (at least
partly) of the process. Our concern in this paper is with the outcome which determines
3 Government of India, Annual Report 2007–2008.
4 Webpage: unicef.org; accessed December 2010.
9women’s ability to make independent decisions. Attempts to measure female autonomy
have relied on two broad categories of variables: variables proxying autonomy through
women’s characteristics (her age, education and employment for example) and variables
reporting the woman's own perception of her status (relating to her freedom to make
decisions, associate with others and make choices).
As part of the first category of variables, Abadian (1996) uses female age at
marriage, age difference between husband and wife and female secondary education to
measure the impact of female autonomy on fertility. Others have used the educational
and economic condition of the woman at marriage5 as well as variables capturing the
woman's labour market experience.6 These reduced form measures do not allow us to
disentangle the direct influence of these variables on the outcome variable from those
indirect influences via their influence on autonomy.
In recent years, Demographic and Health Surveys have started collecting
information centred on the woman’s direct perceptions of her own autonomy. These
relate to whether women have to ask for permission to go out, whether they make
decisions relating to their children (how many to have, whether they should go to
school, whom they should marry etc.), and whether the woman decides what food or
other goods to buy.7 Although the information contained in these questions can give
important insights into the workings of female autonomy, it still remains far from clear
how it is to be translated into a measure of autonomy. Two approaches on how to use
the information contained in the woman’s responses are prominent.
The first approach focuses on specific dimensions of autonomy. This reflects the
rationale that female autonomy is context specific and that the importance of different
dimensions may vary from one setting to the next. These papers include the relevant
answers directly in their outcome model. Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001), for instance,
consider women’s autonomy in terms of freedom from violence, mobility, control over
resources and contribution to decision-making, while Vlassoff (1992), Jejeebhoy (2000)
as well as Morgan and Niraula (1995) consider three dimensions of autonomy (control
over resources, decision-making power and mobility). Chavoshi et al. (2004) use
distinct variables on mobility, decision-making access, control over resources and
5 See for example, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) and Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg (2002).
6 DeRose (2002) uses continuity of woman's work.
7 Information on gender preferences for children is another variable which is often used for measuring
the attitudes of the woman (Yount, Langsten and Hill, 2000).
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freedom from threat to analyse women's reproductive behaviour in Iran. A drawback of
this approach is in the underlying assumption that the answers to the questions provide a
perfect measure of the underlying unobserved autonomy trait.
The second approach employs summary indices constructed from answers to
questions mentioned above. For example, Hogan, Berhanu and Hailemariam (1999)
construct an index using questions on who purchases major items, consumption
patterns, resource allocation, joining a woman's club, sending children to school and age
at which girls should marry. Afridi (2005) also summarises the various aspects of
female autonomy into a single index as do Chakraborty and De (2011) who create an
index from the principal components of a variety of household variables on which the
mother of a child takes decisions. This approach, however, has also been criticised on
the grounds that it is too simplistic and ignores differences across measures (Agarwala
and Lynch (2007)). The addition of qualitative answers into a single index implies that
each answer is given an equal weight in determining a woman’s autonomy. There are
good reasons, however, to believe that some aspects of a woman’s life are more
important for her autonomy than others.
In summary, all measures of autonomy used to date have faced problems of
endogeneity of covariates in the model and/or of measurement errors. In this paper, we
take the multi-dimensionality of autonomy as a starting point and model female
autonomy as a latent factor that cannot be observed directly but will be assumed to
affect a number of measures which can be used to capture the autonomy trait
empirically.8,9 Common variation in these measurement variables will be used to infer
the properties of the latent factor of female autonomy which we assumed to be time
8 Both factor analysis (FA) as well as principal component analysis (PCA), tries to identify underlying
latent factors that help to explain correlations among a set of observable items. FA tries to capture this
data variability in terms of a number of unobservable or latent factors that are conceptualised as some
theoretical concepts. In contrast, extracted components in PCA which are uncorrelated with one
another are simple geometrical abstractions which may not map onto theoretical concepts. Our
analysis is a generalisation of factor analysis where we not only account for the binary nature of the
observables that are used to capture the common variations, but also control for the fact that some
underlying characteristics such as religion, caste and education can also explain the unobserved factor.
9 A list of variables is provided in Appendix 1.
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invariant – at least in the short run.10 In addition, we also allow the autonomy trait to be
correlated with covariates such as religion, caste and female education. This
methodology enables us to address the endogeneity of variables in the outcome equation
due to correlation with the unobserved autonomy trait.
Female Autonomy and its Impact on Child Schooling
While the autonomy of women is an outcome in itself, it is also the impact of this
autonomy on household welfare that has attracted much attention in the literature
(Hoddinott, 1992; Doss, 1996; Kabeer, 1994; Lundberg et al., 1997; Haddad and
Hoddinott, 1991). In this paper, we are particularly concerned with the impact on child
educational outcomes. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) and Afridi (2005) investigate
the effect of female autonomy on children's educational outcomes, defined as the
deviation of the highest grade attained by the child from the cohort mean. Chakraborty
and De (2011) find that the children of Mexican mothers with greater autonomy have
higher enrolment in and lower probability of dropping out of secondary school. Durrant
and Sathar (2000) find that although a higher status for individual women in Pakistan
enhances child survival and boys’ school attendance, community-level autonomy is
more important for improving the chances of girls attending school. Smith and Byron
(2005, studying four South Asian countries – Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan –
find that for South Asia as a whole, improving women’s autonomy is effective in
reducing gender discrimination against girls.
4. The Data, Summary Statistics and Measurements
The data used for the empirical analysis are taken from the third round of the National
Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) for India. The NFHS is part of the Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS) series conducted for about 70 low to middle income countries.11
The survey was conducted in 29 Indian states by the International Institute for
Population Sciences and Macro International (2007) and interviewed over 230,000
10 A number of studies has scrutinised how female autonomy is influenced by different factors. In this
literature female autonomy is considered as the dependent variable. Hashemi, Schuler and Riply
(1996), for example, find that the BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) and Grameen
Bank credit programmes significantly improve female autonomy in Bangladesh. Alternatively
Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001) examine whether differences in female autonomy are attributable to the
geographical location and the religion of the woman. Additionally Bloom, Wypij and Das Gupta
(2001) argued that close ties to kin increase female autonomy. This literature, however, is only of
limited relevance to our analysis. The impacts on female autonomy are likely to take a considerable
amount of time and we only consider a time span of six years.
11 The data are in the public domain and can be downloaded from www.measuredhs.com.
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women (aged 15-49) and men (aged 15-54) during the period December 2005 to August
2006. In common with the DHS, this survey collected extensive information on
population, health, and nutrition, with an emphasis on women and young children.
However, the survey also obtained information on schooling of all household members
such as the highest grade achieved, level of literacy and whether the household member
is still enrolled at school. In addition, information concerning household decision-
making as well as the ‘autonomy’ status of surveyed women was also collected.12
To fully exploit intra-state heterogeneity, we have conducted our analysis
separately for each state. Preliminary analyses were conducted on 15 major states of
India, though in this paper we concentrate on three states (Andhra Pradesh (AP), Kerala
and Uttar Pradesh (UP)) in order to keep the discussion focussed. AP, Kerala and UP
are interesting to analyse because they cover a range of conditions with regard to both
child welfare outcomes and female autonomy. First, while Kerala has very high rates of
school enrolment and adult literacy and education levels, UP has one of the lowest in
India. AP is in between these extremes and, on many measures, is often considered the
median state in India. Thus, in UP, 74% of boys and 64% of girls between 6-17 years
are enrolled in school, whereas it is 89% of boys and 90% of girls in Kerala. In AP,
77% of boys and 66% of girls aged 6 to 17 are enrolled in school.13 Again, while 1% of
children in Kerala never entered school in our sample, this figure is 8% in AP and 18%
in UP (Table 2). More crucially for our analysis, 69% of mothers in UP, 46% in AP and
only 3% in Kerala have never attended school (Table 2). In addition, while 16% of
women in Kerala have tertiary education, the figure for AP and UP is 6%. The
difference in mother’s education across the states is crucial because it could influence
child education both through its impact on autonomy and, more directly in terms of
parental preference for school enrolment. Second, these states also diverge significantly
in terms of their prosperity: in 2004/5, UP had a per capita GDP of Rs. 12198
approximately, whereas Kerala’s was two and half times as much at Rs. 29,065
approximately and AP was Rs.23755.14
Third, the three states have very different kinship systems that underlie family
relations and therefore determine the role of women within them. If India is divided into
12 Due to the protocols associated with the collection of HIV data, this round of the NFHS unfortunately,
did not provide any village level information or any district identifiers.
13 IPPS, DHS Final Report on India, 2005-06.
14 Government of India (2009), Economic Survey, 2008-09.
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three separate kinship systems (following Dyson and Moore, 1983) – the North Indian
System, the South Indian system and the East Indian System, UP is part of the North
Indian system and Kerala and AP of the South Indian system. Within the North Indian
kinship system, spouses are unrelated in terms of kinship, males co-operate with and
receive help only from other males to whom they are related by blood and women do
not inherit property. Such patriliny gives rise to the system of ‘purdah’ for women
which is supposed to enable them to maintain their honour, reputation and power. In
contrast, within the South Indian kinship system, spouses are often closely related
(cross-cousins) to each other; there are close socio-economic relations between males
who are related by blood and by marriage and women may inherit property. This results
in a system within which female movements are less rigidly controlled. Within the
South Indian system itself, Kerala and AP present two different cases. Kerala has a
broadly matrilineal system (though this is increasingly being eroded) within which
women have significant economic and social rights. AP, on the other hand, like most of
the rest of India has a patrilineal system, though its kinship system is broadly South
Indian. Once again, therefore, it falls between UP and Kerala. While our analysis
highlights intra-state differences in autonomy, it will also be interesting to compare how
our results vary across states.
Female Autonomy in India
As is common with the DHS, the Indian NFHS also elicited responses to certain
questions that may be interpreted as providing information on various aspects of
autonomy enjoyed by the woman. The questions have commonly been grouped into
four spheres of autonomy: economic, decision-making, physical and emotional
autonomy. Details of the questions used in the model are included in Appendix 1.
Information on economic autonomy in this dataset is captured through questions
relating to whether the woman has a say about what should be done with her husband’s
money and whether she has money for her own use. Table 3 presents summary
measures for the responses to these questions. In what follows, we will consider these
measures for the three states we concentrate on in this paper. About two-thirds of
women at the All-India level (71%) have some say in what happens to the money of
their husband. In comparison, this figure is 80% in UP, 56% in AP and 61% in Kerala.
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A lower percentage, 45%, of women in India have money for their own use and the
corresponding figures are 22% in Kerala, 59% in AP and 65% in UP.
To capture their decision making autonomy, women were asked whether they
decided jointly with their husbands on a number of household matters. These included
decisions relating to health care, to small and large household purchases and to visits to
family and friends. Summary measures for these aspects of decision-making autonomy
are reported in Table 4. For the whole of India 70% of women have a say on their own
health care and 68% on small and 60% on large household purchases. For the whole
country, 67% of women had a say in visiting family and friends. UP is at or above the
All-India average on all indicators except the decision to visit family and friends. Kerala
too is at or above the All-India average on all four decisions though marginally lower on
the purchase of small household items. AP is lower than the All-India average on all
four measures.
Three variables are employed to measure the extent of the woman’s physical
autonomy. These indicate whether the woman is allowed to go to a health facility, the
market and places outside the community. More than 90% of women across all states
enjoy all of these freedoms though again, UP women seem to fare the best, followed by
those from AP and finally from Kerala. The respective figures are reported in Table 5.
Finally, emotional autonomy is captured by considering questions on physical
violence and sexual relations within the household. Again, UP women fare better than
the All-India average on all 10 of these questions whereas in the case of Kerala and
Andhra women, emotional autonomy varies according to the question being asked.
Summary measures of the responses to these questions can be found in Table 6.
As mentioned earlier, many studies aggregate qualitative responses into indices.
For the purposes of comparison, we also present aggregate responses for each
dimension and the overarching concept of autonomy are reported in Table 7. The index
for female autonomy takes a maximum value of 19 and an average of 13.8 for the All-
India sample. The mean value for AP is 12.8 with a standard deviation of 4.0.
Compared to All-India average and dispersion, AP has a lower mean and also higher
dispersion. The average for Kerala is much closer to the All-India average.
Interestingly, the UP average is higher and also the distribution of the index is much
less dispersed relative to the All-India index. Given the complexity of the concepts
15
concerned, we do not pool our analysis to use cross-state variations. Instead, we
concentrate on within-state variations.
5. Econometric Methodology
Our estimation methodology uses survival analysis in which female autonomy is treated
as a latent construct which is allowed to be correlated with the covariates in the
equation. The main variable of interest is the age at which the child entered primary
school. In survival analysis terminology, a child here is transiting from the state “out of
school” into the state “in school”. The time a child spends without entering school from
the prescribed start-age (usually 6) is the duration we are interested in. Starting age is
recorded with respect to the Indian academic year, which is the 1st of April, and is
recorded in years. We use a discrete time hazard framework and restrict our analysis to
a sample of children between 6 and 11 years at the time of the interview. If a child has
not started school at the time of the interview the duration is coded as censored.
All durations are measured with respect to age 6. For example, if a child is
observed to enter school at age 8, the duration for this child will be recorded as 3 years.
This implies an observable window of duration equal to a maximum of six years. All
children entering school at age 6 will be recorded to have duration of one.
The discrete time hazard hk for the kth interval (k=1,..,6) denotes the conditional
probability of a child entering school in the kth interval conditional on not having
enrolled in school before,
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Hence, the probability of observing a completed duration of length d is given by
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In the above specification, d denotes the age at which the child i in family j enters
school where the entry age is measured with respect to age 6. In the case of a child who
is not observed to enter the school, i.e. the probability of an incomplete spell of d years,
is given by
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The above model consisting of equations (2) and (3) can be recast in terms of a binary
choice model by observing that each child will have multiple observations (Allison,
1982). Since the observation window is age 6 to 11, each child will have a set of up to
six binary indicators taking the value of 0, continuously in all years, starting from age 6
until s/he enters school when the binary indicator will take the value of 1. If an
observation is censored, that is if the child is not observed to enter school during the
observation window, the child will only have a series of 0s. To provide an example, first
consider a child who is aged 8 at the time of the interview and who entered school at the
age of 6. This child will have one observation recording a value of 1 as the child
entered aged 6. Take another child who is also aged 8 but has not entered school by the
time of the interview. This child will have three observations (one for each year starting
from 6 to 8) recording a value of 0 for every observation. A child who is 11 at the time
of the interview and not observed to enter school will have six observations all
recording a value of 0. The last two cases provide an example of a case where the
durations are censored.
In summary, given the above discussion, there will be a set of 0s and 1s for each
child in the family. The length of this column vector will depend on the age at which
the child entered school and also whether the time to starting the school is censored or
not.
For child i with mother j, we assume h(k) to be a logit
)exp(1
)exp(
)( )2()3(
)2()3(
CijFjFkij
CijFjFkij
ij x
x
kh



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 (4)
ijx is a vector of observable child and family specific characteristics (to be discussed
later) that influence hij(k) and  is the vector of parameters associated with ijx . k is the
interval specific intercept that informs us about the shape of the hazard. The autonomy
status of the mother is )3(Fj and the effect of this on the hazard is Fwhichis known as
17
the factor loading, is our parameter of interest.15 )2(Cij denotes the child specific
unobservable. The above specification is a multilevel hierarchical model where Level 1
refers to the age specific time intervals. Levels 2 and 3 refer to the child and mother
respectively. The superscripts indicate the level of the variable under consideration. In
addition, we also allow for an additional cluster at the district level which forms the 4th
level. However, we do not explicitly show this to keep the notation simpler.
As per our previous discussions, we do not use an aggregate index formed from
the set of answers given by the woman as measurement of female autonomy. Instead,
we assume that the latent trait of female autonomy is an exogenous cultural trait which
is correlated with the woman’s characteristics such as caste, religion, education, and
whether the woman lives in a rural household. In addition, we also allow this latent trait
to depend on when the woman was born. For mother j, this is specified as
FjjFj z  
)3( (5)
Next we assume that the unobserved female autonomy trait ( )3(Fj ) affects a
number of different but interrelated aspects of the woman’s life. Based on the form in
which the data has been made available and also on the approach taken by researchers
in the past, we consider four categories or spheres of autonomy: economic, decision-
making, physical, and emotional autonomy and specify the relationship between these
spheres of autonomy ( )3(lj with l=1,..,4) and
)3(
Fj as
ljFjllj  
)3()3( (6)
The assumption here is that variations in these four spheres can be used to say
something about the overarching concept of female autonomy that is also unobserved.
Since the spheres of autonomy are likely to be correlated with one another we allow for
correlations in the error terms ( lj ).
The last part of our model links the answers given by the woman to different
spheres of autonomy in order to generate the necessary variations to use in equation (6).
Intuitively, this can be pictured as follows: each of the four autonomy-spheres cannot be
observed directly but is captured by a set of nineteen fallible measures (given by the
15 For identification and facilitating inter-state comparisons the variance of female autonomy is set equal
to one in the estimation.
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answers to a set of questions provided in Appendix 1). For each sphere, common
variation in these measurements is used to infer its properties. All nineteen
measurement variables are binary and we consequently specify the following linear
predictor for a logit link as
)3(
jjj   (7)
where j is a vector of intercepts and
)3(
j a vector of latent autonomy spheres
(economic autonomy, physical autonomy, decision-making autonomy, and emotional
autonomy). The matrix of coefficients  contains the factor loadings.
An important advantage of this specification is that it accommodates correlations
between the latent factor and female characteristics. Often female autonomy is modelled
as a random effect which is assumed to be uncorrelated with all covariates. There are,
however, good reasons to believe that the latent factor of female autonomy is not
independent of female characteristics (education, for instance). This would make any
estimator that does not account for this correlation, inconsistent. By contrast, equation
(5) allows us to explicitly incorporate the fact that female autonomy is correlated with a
sub-set of the covariates.
Appendix 1 provides further details of the full specifications and the restrictions
needed for identification. Figure 1 provides a simple representation of the path diagram
associated with the various relationships that are considered here.16
Estimation of the Model
Equations (4) to (7) form the basis of our model and they are estimated jointly using
maximum likelihood method under the assumption that is normally distributed.17
6. Results
The empirical analysis focuses on a sample of children aged 6 to 11 for the whole
country. For AP, the sample size is 2419 children born to 1737 mothers. The
16 The above model is slightly different to the model used in Hansen et al. (2004) and Heckman et al.
(2006), where they assume two underlying latent independent characteristics ‘cognitive’ and non-
cognitive’ abilities and relate these to test scores. These authors allow the test scores to be affected by
additional school level variables conditional on the latent variables. In contrast, in our model, we
allow the latent variables to be correlated with characteristics such as religion, caste etc. In addition,
we also link the female autonomy trait to the four sub-spheres and allow these to be correlated.
17 We use GLLAMM (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal and Pickles, 2004) in Stata (StataCorp., 1985) to
estimate the model parameters. The programme can be downloaded at gllamm.org.
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corresponding figures for Kerala are 1051 and 842 and for UP 6510 and 4160. The
model estimated allows a number of additional factors to influence children’s entry into
school. These comprise characteristics of the child, the mother, the father, the household
and the baseline hazard. The child’s characteristics are the sex of the child and the
number of older and younger brothers as well as sisters. Mother’s characteristics include
a dummy for whether she has completed primary school, her caste and her religion. The
father’s education is also controlled for. The household’s characteristics can affect its
member’s economic outcomes and are therefore included in the model. They encompass
an indicator variable for the wealth quintile the household belongs to and whether it is
situated in a rural area. Finally, interval specific indicators and indicators for the year
the child turned 6 are included. The former make up the baseline hazard and the latter
control for initial conditions. This is important as children born in different years would
have faced different environments at the time of entry into primary school. Mother
specific covariates are allowed to influence the overall concept of female autonomy.
We estimate four models. Model 1 analyses school entry without allowance for
female autonomy. This specification encompasses all the above-mentioned child-,
mother-, father- and household-specific factors. We do not include the female autonomy
variable but allow for mother level random effect. Models 2 and 2a, conversely model
female autonomy via an index constructed as a z-score using the sum of qualitative
answers provided by the woman. The original variable takes a maximum value of 19
and the means and standard deviations of the sub-spheres as well as the overall ‘female
autonomy’ variable, are reported in Table 7. Since the latent factor in Model 3 is
restricted to have zero mean and unit variance, we enter the aggregate autonomy index
in Model 2 as a z-score to facilitate comparison between the models. The approach used
in Model 2 corresponds to the usual way of capturing female autonomy. Model 1
includes a random intercept at the child-, mother- and district-level. Model 2 is
estimated once with the three aforementioned random intercepts (Model 2) and once
only with a random intercept at the child- and district-level (Model 2a).
Finally, Model 3 is our structural equation model specification summarised in
equations (4) to (7) where each sphere of female autonomy is captured by a number of
fallible measures. These spheres subsequently make up the overarching concept of
female autonomy, which in turn affects entry into school. Unlike in Models 2 and 2a,
the structural approach taken in Model 3, allows us to separate the direct and indirect
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effects coming through the effects on autonomy, of parental characteristics (Figure 1).
The socio-economic factors in this figure are represented by the vector zi and the arrow
to the latent factor of female autonomy indicates their influence on this concept. In
order to capture gender differences in the effect of female autonomy, this latent
construct is interacted with the girl dummy in the hazard equation.
6.1 Female Autonomy & School Starting Age
We present the coefficient estimates and the standard errors for our main variables of
interest: female autonomy and the baseline hazard variables in Table 8.18 Note, the
mother level random effect in Model 1, will pick up the effect of unobserved
‘autonomy’ characteristic as well as other omitted mother level factors. A comparison
of Models 2 and 2a will tell us something about how much of the mother-level variance
is being picked up by the aggregate index for female autonomy.19 In Model 3, the
mother level unobservable effect is picked up by the ‘autonomy’ variable. The estimates
of the variance of the mother-level random effect are reported at the bottom of Table
8.20 Significant unobserved heterogeneity is found in UP and AP (Models 1 and 2).21
Only Kerala shows no signs of such heterogeneity. Furthermore, the inclusion of the
aggregate index does not seem to help to capture this heterogeneity (Model 2).22 Despite
the inclusion of the z-score as an explanatory variable in Model 2, the variance of the
mother-level random effect is still significantly different from zero in these states. If the
index was properly capturing the unobserved heterogeneity, we would expect the
variance of mother level random effects to become insignificant once this variable is
added. Excluding the mother-level random effects in Model 2a (but leaving the Z score
in), does not make a significant difference to the results in any of the three states under
consideration. In addition, if the qualitative answers are fallible measures of the
underlying autonomy trait, the aggregate index will be correlated with the unobserved
18 The estimates for all other covariates are reported in Appendix 2 Table A2.2.
19 Note omitting the mother-level random component will not affect the consistency property of the
estimator (Robinson, 1982) except in the case where the mother-level random component is correlated
with one or more of the regressors. Model 3 allows for this correlation.
20 Note, one cannot identify the variance of the autonomy variable separately from that of the effect of
the autonomy in Models 1 and 2. The variance is restricted to be 1 in Models 2a and 3.
21 Same conclusion is drawn from a comparison of the maximised values of the log likelihood.
22 Models 1, 2 and 2a are not nested within Model 3 and thus not comparable with Model 3 in terms of
log likelihood values.
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autonomy variable and hence the estimator would be inconsistent in this model
invalidating our inference in Models 2 and 2a.23
In Kerala, both the effects of female autonomy and its interaction with the girl
dummy are insignificant. The estimates for UP paint a different picture. In models 1
and 2, mother level random effects are very significant in determining school entry. In
model 3 for UP, the female autonomy variable and its interaction with girls are both
highly significant. Our results indicate that, like UP, mother level random effects are
significant in AP with the size of the effect being larger in AP implying a higher
variation in the unobserved heterogeneity. When modelled as a latent variable in Model
3, however, there is only a marginally significant impact of female autonomy on school
entry of girls in AP. These results present an interesting contrast to expectations. In UP,
female autonomy is highly significant in influencing the SSA. In AP, it is marginally
significant and only for girls and in Kerala, it is not significant at all. In summary, once
allowance for correlation between covariates and female autonomy is allowed for, we
find significant female autonomy effect in UP only.
Comparing the results to Model 2 and Model 2a, we find that the use of the
aggregate index does not help explain school enrolment of children. As Agarwala and
Lynch (2007) pointed out, measuring female autonomy by employing indices is overly
simplistic. One of the major drawbacks is that every answer is given the same weight.
So, for instance, the woman having money for her own use is assumed to be as
important for female autonomy and for the final indicator (children’s education in our
case) as the woman’s freedom to decide what to purchase for the household.
Furthermore, aggregating qualitative answers provided by the woman ignores the fact
that different questions relate to different spheres, which in turn are interconnected. The
results of the present analysis imply that, by neglecting these details, a large part of the
effect of female autonomy is not captured. In other words, by not modelling the
complex relationships between the various measurements of autonomy as well as their
interrelations, the effect of female autonomy is attenuated. We discuss this issue further
in Section 7 of the paper.
23 This is similar to the reasoning that test scores used in traditional wage equation models to capture
unobserved ability will be correlated with omitted ability if the test scores are assumed to be fallible
measures of ‘ability’ (see for example Heckman et al. (2006)).
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Finally, we estimate that a two standard deviation increase in female autonomy
is associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in primary school enrolment by age
six in AP and in Kerala with 0.3 percentage points. In UP, by contrast, the difference in
enrolment rates is 2 percentage points, which implies that for every 1000 children in
UP, an extra 20 children would have been enrolled by age 6 which is the recommended
school starting age, if the mother’s autonomy level was higher by 2 standard deviations
from the mean.
Prima facie, the present findings suggest four conclusions. First, in situations
like Kerala where the social ‘norm’ for school entry at 6 years exists and is strong,
female autonomy (or any other household and parental characteristics) is not significant
in influencing school starting age. Of course, these results can also be interpreted as
indicating that when the norm for schooling is strong, there is little variation left for
covariates to explain. Secondly, in situations (like UP) where there is considerably more
variation in SSA, female autonomy is extremely significant in influencing school
starting age. Third, in states like AP, school entry at 6 years is not a norm and is
influenced by a number of factors including household wealth and religion. Fourth,
methodologically, we can also conclude that the impact of this variable would be
missed if we did not model it appropriately – allowing for variations across spheres of
autonomy, correlations with household characteristics and also interactions between
them – as we have done in Model 3.
6.2 School enrolment probability age profiles
We next turn to the age profile of the conditional probabilities of entering school as the
child gets older (conditioned on the child not having enrolled up to that point), ceteris
paribus. These are the k coefficients given in equation (6). We allow this to be
different for boys and girls. The results are reported in Table 8. The reference case is
entry at the recommended age of six.
In Kerala, unsurprisingly, the conditional probability of entering school is not
found to vary significantly as children get older. In Model 3, there is evidence that this
probability decreases with age (up to 8 years but not beyond) but no gender differences
in this probability are found.
In UP however, there are significant changes to the probability of entry as the
children get older. The probability of entry at age 6 is significantly smaller for girls
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relative to boys (the coefficient on ‘girl’ dummy). In Models 1 and 2, the probability of
school entry is found to increase with age for both genders before it flattens out and
becomes insignificant after age 8-9 years. In contrast, the probability for girls is only
significantly different (and lower) in the 8-9 years age group. Model 3, by contrast,
indicates an inverted U-shaped hazard for boys wherein the probability of going to
school first increases between 6-7 years but decreases thereafter. For girls in UP, on the
other hand, even in Model 3, the probability of going to school keeps decreasing and
then becomes insignificant. Thus, our preferred Model 3 leads us to conclude that if
children are not in school by 7 years in UP, then the probability that they will enrol
keeps decreasing.
In AP, models 1 and 2 show a significant decrease in the probability of school
entry only between 8-9 years and 9-10 years. For girls, the probability decreases a little
earlier (7-8 years). Model 3 indicates that the probability of school entry for boys first
increases (up to 7-8 years) and then decreases significantly. For girls, the only
significant conditional probability relative to those of boys is at 7-8 years. Thus, in
conclusion, the longer the children stay out of school in AP, the less likely they will
enter school. In addition, there are no gender differences in the conditional probability
of school entry in AP.
These results are consistent with the fact that in the initial years, many children
are not sent to school because their parents have other priorities so that a delay of a year
or two in schooling is not seen as very significant. However, as parents recognise that
time is passing and they need to send their children to school, the school entry
probabilities increase at the beginning but, beyond a certain age, only the more difficult
cases remain and parents may simply decide that it is ‘too late’. Our results also seem to
confirm that the norm for schooling is very strong in Kerala and the lack of variation in
school starting ages.
6.3 Autonomy variables and other female characteristics (equations (5)(7))
Our preferred model is Model 3 where we assume that the answers given to a set of
nineteen questions (see Appendix 1) are fallible measures of unobserved underlying
sub-spheres of autonomy. In this model, we also allow the overall concept of female
autonomy to be correlated with female characteristics. The estimated associations are
reported in Table 9. Since the autonomy variable is set to have zero mean, the reference
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case in this model is assigned a value of 0 for ‘autonomy’. Additionally, for
identification purposes, the effect of a mother belonging to scheduled caste was set
equal to (positive) one. Hence, all estimated effects are to be interpreted with respect to
the effect of this variable. As one would expect more educated women to be more
autonomous, the positive sign of the education variable indicates that the estimated
effects of all the other covariates are correctly signed.
Overall the estimated results are mixed and vary across the three states. For
Kerala, the only significant correlation with autonomy appears to be for female
education. Furthermore, there are no significant differences in female autonomy across
cohorts, except for women born in the most recent cohort (the youngest) who have the
least autonomy. This is not surprising because they are young and are likely to be less
confident. Also, they may have to answer both to husbands and mothers-in-law.
In contrast to Kerala, for UP and AP, many of the female characteristics are
found to be significantly correlated with autonomy. Caste and education play an
important role in shaping women’s autonomy in both states. Women belonging to
scheduled tribes and other backward castes have greater autonomy relative to women
from ‘forward’ castes (which is the base category). Education is positively correlated
with autonomy. Muslim women have more autonomy than others and rural women have
less autonomy than urban women in both states. Generally, older women are found to
have more autonomy, as expected. These results emphasise the importance of allowing
for the correlation between female autonomy and other characteristics of the woman
and the household as we have done in Model 3.
Our specification in Model 3 allows us to estimate the interrelations between the
four sub-spheres of autonomy and their overarching concept. In the present model every
sub-sphere is regressed on the overall concept of female autonomy. Results for this are
in Table 10. For Kerala the influence on the sub-spheres does not appear strong. All the
estimates are insignificant. In UP and AP, by contrast, the estimated factor loadings
vary between the various sub-spheres. In AP, we find that female autonomy has a
positive, significant effect on both decision-making autonomy and emotional autonomy.
In UP, on the other hand, female autonomy appears to have a positive influence on
emotional autonomy and a negative effect on decision-making autonomy relative to its
effect on economic autonomy which is assigned a value of 1 (for identification
purposes). A tentative interpretation of these results is strategic interaction between the
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spouses. More precisely: it might be the case that the woman trades off one sphere
against the other. It may be the case, for instance, that she values emotional autonomy
more than decision-making autonomy. In such a case she might renounce bargaining
power on one set of issues in order to increase her say on another set. As a result female
autonomy influences decision-making negatively and emotional autonomy positively.
These interactions could be the focus of further research.
Overall, the heterogeneity exhibited by the results in this sub-section is
noteworthy and emphasises the complexity of the concept of female autonomy. The fact
that the correlations between the explanatory variables and the four sub-spheres varies
to such an extent is particularly telling. This finding must suggest that a plethora of
factors and strategic interactions lies behind the autonomy of a woman, further
highlighting the importance of more research in this area.
6.4 Effects of other covariates on school entry probabilities
Our results to Model 3 (see Appendix Table A2.2) indicate that scheduled tribe children
are less likely to enrol in school in both Kerala and AP. In UP, both scheduled caste and
other backward caste children are less likely to enter into school, while it is scheduled
tribes and other backward castes that are less likely to go to school in AP. Muslim
children, similarly, are less likely to go to school in both AP and UP though in Kerala,
this effect is not significant. We have already seen that mother’s education influences
female autonomy and through this affects school entry age. Our results indicate that
mother’s education also has a direct significant positive effect on the hazard of the child
entering school in both Kerala and AP though this effect is variable across models in
UP. This direct effect is largest and most significant in Kerala. Father’s education is
also highly significant and this is true for both primary and secondary education, though
the size of the latter effect is smaller.
Wealth has almost no significant effect on school entry age in Kerala (as one
might expect) but it is significant in UP, particularly in the top quintile and especially so
in AP in all quintiles. It is clear that the probability of school entry is higher for the 5th
wealth quintile than the first in all the models for both AP and UP. The conditional
probability of a child entering school is higher in rural areas in UP and AP than in urban
areas, which is rather surprising given that there are more alternative uses of children’s
time in farming regions.
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The birth order of the indexed child has no impact in Kerala and slightly
increases the probability of school entry for the second born child in AP. However, in
UP, children born second or third show significantly lower probabilities of entering into
school than firstborn children. Contrary to this, our results to model 3 indicate that the
influence of the birth order being three or above in UP on the hazard is positive and
significant implying that while the probability of school entry decreases for 2nd and 3rd
born children, it increases for children lower down the birth order. Furthermore, girls
appear to be significantly less likely to enrol in school in UP and significantly more
likely to enrol in AP. With regard to the initial conditions, we find these to be entirely
insignificant in Kerala but highly significant in UP. Children who were 6 years in 2003
were more likely to go to school in UP whereas those who were 6 years in 2005 were
less likely to go to school. In AP, children who were 6 years in 2004 and 2005 were less
likely to go to school. As discussed earlier, the hazards are also significant in UP and
AP but not in Kerala.
We can conclude that very few factors, other than parent’s education, influence
child school entry age in Kerala. On the other hand, in AP and UP, socio-economic
characteristics of the household and demographic characteristics of the child as well as
initial conditions play a significant role in determining the age of entry of the child into
school. This leads us to conclude that schooling is a ‘norm’ in Kerala and given this,
and its consequent lack of variability, there is very little that influences it. It is less of a
norm in AP and UP.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
As indicated earlier, female autonomy is an end in itself but also a means to better
welfare outcomes within the home. Our results in this paper indicate that mother’s
education is crucial in all three states, both in influencing female autonomy and also in
influencing the school starting age of children. Using mother’s education as a proxy for
autonomy in the outcome equation, as a number of previous papers have done, would
therefore obscure at least part of this picture. The methodology used in this paper
enables us to separate the direct effects of important covariates on autonomy from the
effects on the outcome of interest conditional on autonomy.
Our more detailed analysis offers greater insight into the role played by female
autonomy in influencing school entry in Kerala and AP/UP. First, female autonomy is
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unaffected by the socio-economic characteristics of the woman or her family in Kerala.
The only exception is female education which positively influences female autonomy in
all three states. This confirms that female autonomy is a ‘norm’ in Kerala, one that is
experienced by women of different characteristics. This is in contrast to AP and UP
where almost all the socio-economic characteristics (caste, religion, birth cohort, rural
abode) influence female autonomy. In UP, for instance, maternal autonomy depends
heavily upon the socio-economic characteristics of the woman indicating that while
women from some groups with certain socio-economic characteristics may enjoy
autonomy in UP, others do not.
Our second main finding in this paper is that, like female autonomy, starting
school at the prescribed age of 6 years is also more of a norm in Kerala. It is not
affected by female autonomy or by other household characteristics, except by the level
of education of parents. In AP and UP, on the other hand, the school starting age is
significantly affected by female autonomy levels, caste, religion, wealth and initial
conditions. These results indicate that while children from some families in these states
start school at the prescribed age, others do not. It is therefore not surprising that the
school starting age window is much longer in AP and UP than in Kerala and that right
censoring is also more prevalent in UP than in Kerala.
From the point of view of policy, our results therefore indicate that in states like
Kerala much less remains to be done with regard to both maternal autonomy and school
entry than in states like AP and UP. In the latter, an attempt to target families with
certain household characteristics could help to simultaneously improve both female
autonomy and school outcomes. The fact that female autonomy is an outcome variable
in its own right and is also an important input into schooling outcomes reinforces the
significance of our results for policy. The importance of schooling, in its turn, is borne
out by the fact that the one variable that is significant in all three states in influencing
both female autonomy and child education is the parent’s education. The estimated
average partial effects of maternal education on the probability of children enrolling in
school were: 0.03 for AP and Kerala, and 0.11 for UP. Given the average enrolment
rate at age 6 of 0.57 for UP, an increase of 0.11 points is a very large increase. This
reiterates the point that educating current generations is therefore crucial for the well-
being of future generations.
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Figure 1: Path Diagram
Notes: (i) Path diagram represents workings of our statistical model given in equations (4)-(7). (ii)
m1 to m19 refer to Female Autonomy measurements laid out in Appendix 1. (iii) Squares refer to
observed variables and circles to latent variables. (iv) Single-headed arrows refer to coefficients or
factor loadings, double-headed arrows to correlations; (v) district d, family j and child i refer to
clusters at district, mother and child levels.
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Table 1
Distribution of Starting school age, percentages
Age When School Started
6 7 8 9 10 11 Censored Observations
STATES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
All India 70 10 4 1 0.3 0.02 14
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 81 8 2 0.2 0.04 - 9
Bihar 35 14 8 3 1 0.1 38
Gujarat 85 6 2 0.2 0.2 - 7
Haryana 77 8 2 1 0.2 - 12
Karnataka 84 7 1 0.5 0.2 0.1 7
Kerala 97 2 0.1 0.3 - - 0.7
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 69 10 4 1 0.3 - 15
Maharashtra 85 7 2 0.4 0.03 - 5
Orissa 80 7 3 1 - - 10
Punjab 73 13 4 0.7 0.2 - 10
Rajasthan 63 11 5 1 0.3 - 19
Tamil Nadu (TN) 96 2 1 - - - 1
West Bengal (WB) 63 15 7 2 0.2 - 14
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 57 14 7 2 0.4 0.02 19
North Eastern States (NE) 64 12 6 2 0.4 0.1 17
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,
Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) Columns [1]-[6]: children entered school at age 6, 7, …, 11; Column [7]: children never having attended school.
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Table 2
Educational Attainments of Children and the Parents in Percentages
CHILDREN MOTHER MOTHER’S HUSBAND
STATES
Never
attended
School Entered Advanced Repeating
Dropped
out
Never
Attended
Primary
Education
Secondary
Education
Tertiary
Education
Never
Attended
Primary
Education
Secondary
Education
Tertiary
Education
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
All India 13 7 76 2 1 47 16 31 6 26 19 44 11
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 8 4 85 1 1 46 14 34 6 31 18 39 12
Bihar 36 13 49 0.2 1 72 8 17 2 40 11 37 11
Gujarat 6 2 85 5 1 46 15 33 6 21 20 50 9
Haryana 10 6 81 2 0.2 58 12 27 3 26 12 54 8
Karnataka 6 7 82 1 1 49 14 34 4 30 20 40 9
Kerala 1 5 93 1 0.3 3 11 71 16 3 17 68 12
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 13 8 75 2 1 57 15 21 7 30 20 36 14
Maharashtra 5 7 86 1 0.5 28 16 46 10 14 19 52 15
Orissa 9 5 81 3 1 52 21 24 3 32 26 32 8
Punjab 9 8 80 1 1 40 16 38 6 25 14 53 8
Rajasthan 18 8 71 1 1 77 9 10 4 38 17 35 9
Tamil Nadu (TN) 1 3 96 1 0.1 27 28 37 8 17 28 46 10
West Bengal (WB) 14 10 72 3 1 48 20 27 6 34 22 34 9
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 18 10 69 2 1 69 10 16 6 31 16 42 11
North Eastern States (NE) 15 6 74 3 0.3 36 20 39 5 23 20 46 11
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland,
Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) Column [1]: child has never attended school; Column [2]: child has entered school at the beginning of the academic year April 2005; Column [3]: child has
advanced to the next grade at the beginning of the academic year April 2005; Column [4]: child did not advance to the next grade at the beginning of the academic year April 2005 and must repeat year;
Column [5]: child dropped out of school at the beginning of the academic year April 2005; Column [6]: mother has never attended school; Column [7]: mother has either incomplete primary education
or complete primary education; Column [8]: mother has either incomplete secondary education or complete secondary education; Column [9]: mother has tertiary education; Column [10]: mother’s
husband has never attended school; Column [11]: mother’s husband has either incomplete primary education or complete primary education; Column [12]: mother’s husband has either incomplete
secondary education or complete secondary education; Column [13]: mother’s husband has tertiary education.
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Table 3
Economic Autonomy, Percentages [State Ranks]
Woman decides on Woman has money
husband's money for own use
STATES [1] [2]
All India 71 [8] 45 [7]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 56 [16] 59 [4]
Bihar 71 [8] 63 [2]
Gujarat 69 [11] 60 [3]
Haryana 74 [5] 35 [10]
Karnataka 58 [15] 59 [4]
Kerala 61 [13] 22 [15]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 72 [6] 47 [4]
Maharashtra 76 [3] 44 [8]
Orissa 70 [10] 38 [9]
Punjab 72 [6] 28 [13]
Rajasthan 62 [12] 33 [11]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 78 [2] 24 [14]
West Bengal (WB) 58 [14] 38 [9]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 80 [1] 65 [1]
North Eastern States (NE) 76 [3] 33 [11]
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the
beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) Column [1]: Woman
decides either herself or jointly with her husband on what to do with husband’s money;
Column [2]: woman has money for her own that she alone can decide how to use.
Table 4
Decision-Making Autonomy, Percentages [State Ranks]
Woman decides on Woman decides on Woman decides on Woman decides on
own health care small household large household visiting family
purchases purchases and friends
STATES [1] [2] [3] [4]
All India 70 [7] 68 [6] 60 [6] 67 [8]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 64 [10] 62 [12] 55 [11] 65 [10]
Bihar 61 [11] 69 [5] 60 [6] 63 [11]
Gujarat 61 [11] 72 [4] 56 [9] 73 [4]
Haryana 73 [4] 64 [10] 56 [9] 72 [6]
Karnataka 51 [16] 57 [14] 51 [14] 55 [14]
Kerala 75 [3] 67 [8] 62 [5] 78 [2]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 57 [14] 63 [11] 56 [10] 56 [13]
Maharashtra 68 [8] 75 [3] 65 [2] 75 [3]
Orissa 67 [9] 66 [9] 60 [6] 67 [8]
Punjab 76 [2] 59 [13] 50 [13] 69 [7]
Rajasthan 54 [15] 56 [15] 46 [15] 47 [16]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 72 [5] 77 [2] 64 [3] 73 [4]
West Bengal (WB) 61 [11] 50 [16] 41 [16] 51 [15]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 72 [5] 68 [6] 64 [3] 61 [12]
North Eastern States (NE) 79 [1] 78 [1] 73 [1] 81 [1]
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year
April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii)
Column [1]: woman decides alone or jointly with husband on own health care; Column [2]: woman decides alone or jointly
with husband on small household purchases; Column [3]: woman decides alone or jointly with husband on large household
purchases; Column [4]: woman decides alone or jointly with husband on visiting family and friends.
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Table 5
Physical Autonomy, Percentages [State Ranks]
Woman can go Woman can go Woman can go
to the market to places outside to health facility
the community
STATES [1] [2] [3]
All India 91 [8] 94 [9] 97 [7]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 87 [12] 95 [7] 97 [7]
Bihar 90 [11] 88 [14] 97 [7]
Gujarat 97 [2] 96 [4] 97 [7]
Haryana 95 [6] 88 [14] 97 [7]
Karnataka 81 [14] 99 [1] 99 [1]
Kerala 80 [15] 85 [15] 94 [15]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 97 [2] 98 [2] 98 [3]
Maharashtra 91 [8] 90 [12] 94 [15]
Orissa 86 [13] 96 [4] 98 [3]
Punjab 97 [2] 90 [12] 98 [3]
Rajasthan 98 [1] 98 [2] 99 [1]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 97 [2] 93 [10] 97 [7]
West Bengal (WB) 80 [15] 91 [11] 96 [14]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 91 [8] 95 [7] 97 [7]
North Eastern States (NE) 95 [6] 96 [4] 98 [3]
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the
beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) Column [1]: woman is
allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to the market; Column [2]: woman is
allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to places outside the community. Column
[3]: woman is allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to a health facility.
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Table 6
Emotional Autonomy, Percentages [State Ranks]
STATES
Woman believes
her husband is not
justified beating her
if she goes out
without telling him
Woman believes her
husband is not
justified beating her
if she neglects the
house and children
Woman believes her
husband is not
justified beating her
if she argues with
him
Woman believes her
husband is not
justified beating her
if she refuses sex
Woman believes
her husband is
not justified
beating her if she
burns the food
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
All India 67 [6] 60 [9] 66 [6] 82 [7] 81 [5]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 55 [14] 50 [13] 61 [11] 72 [15] 73 [10]
Bihar 75 [4] 79 [1] 66 [6] 85 [4] 82 [2]
Gujarat 62 [11] 55 [11] 55 [16] 74 [13] 66 [16]
Haryana 63 [8] 67 [5] 64 [8] 73 [14] 73 [10]
Karnataka 53 [15] 46 [14] 61 [11] 67 [16] 69 [15]
Kerala 63 [8] 55 [11] 73 [4] 83 [5] 78 [8]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 79 [2] 78 [2] 75 [2] 89 [2] 82 [2]
Maharashtra 79 [2] 64 [7] 74 [3] 82 [7] 80 [6]
Orissa 57 [13] 56 [10] 57 [14] 82 [7] 73 [10]
Punjab 67 [6] 64 [7] 64 [8] 76 [12] 75 [9]
Rajasthan 63 [8] 65 [6] 61 [11] 83 [5] 72 [13]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 51 [16] 37 [16] 56 [15] 81 [10] 71 [14]
West Bengal (WB) 81 [1] 74 [3] 76 [1] 86 [3] 87 [1]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 75 [4] 72 [4] 72 [5] 90 [1] 82 [2]
North Eastern States
(NE) 60 [12] 44 [15] 64 [8] 81 [10] 80 [6]
STATES
Woman believes
her husband is not
justified beating
her if she is
unfaithful
Woman believes
her husband is not
justified beating
her if she is
disrespectful
Woman believes
she is justified
refusing sex if
husband has other
women
Woman believes
she is justified
refusing sex if
husband has
sexually
transmitted disease
Woman believes
she is justified
refusing sex if
she is tired
[6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
All India 69 [9] 54 [10] 81 [8] 82 [7] 80 [4]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 57 [15] 47 [13] 80 [10] 78 [11] 77 [10]
Bihar 72 [6] 65 [1] 91 [1] 86 [4] 80 [4]
Gujarat 63 [10] 55 [8] 74 [13] 77 [12] 69 [16]
Haryana 61 [12] 57 [6] 87 [4] 83 [6] 79 [6]
Karnataka 57 [15] 43 [16] 82 [7] 79 [9] 78 [8]
Kerala 76 [4] 56 [7] 75 [11] 76 [13] 72 [15]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 72 [6] 62 [3] 91 [1] 92 [1] 92 [1]
Maharashtra 80 [3] 58 [5] 71 [15] 75 [14] 75 [13]
Orissa 60 [13] 47 [13] 56 [16] 75 [14] 76 [11]
Punjab 58 [14] 55 [8] 85 [5] 85 [5] 79 [6]
Rajasthan 70 [8] 51 [11] 91 [1] 92 [1] 87 [3]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 85 [1] 51 [11] 73 [14] 79 [9] 78 [8]
West Bengal (WB) 84 [2] 65 [1] 75 [11] 69 [16] 75 [13]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 74 [5] 62 [3] 85 [5] 88 [3] 89 [2]
North Eastern States
(NE) 62 [11] 44 [15] 81 [8] 82 [7] 76 [11]
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year
April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii)
The answers to the questions are binary indicators as explained in Appendix 1.
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Table 7
Traditional Female Autonomy Indices, Means (Standard Deviation)
[State Ranks]
Economic Dec-Making Physical Emotional Female Female
Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Median
(S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.)
(Interquartile
Range)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All India 1.2 [4] 2.6 [5] 2.8 [7] 7.2 [7] 13.8 [6] 14 [5]
(0.7) (1.5) (0.5) (2.6) (3.5) (5.0)
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 1.1 [8] 2.5 [11] 2.8 [7] 6.4 [14] 12.8 [15] 13 [13]
(0.7) (1.7) (0.6) (3.0) (4.0) (6.0)
Bihar 1.3 [2] 2.5 [11] 2.8 [7] 7.8 [3] 14.5 [3] 15 [1]
(0.7) (1.5) (0.6) (2.3) (3.3) (5.0)
Gujarat 1.3 [2] 2.6 [5] 2.9 [2] 6.7 [12] 13.5 [9] 14 [5]
(0.7) (1.4) (0.5) (2.9) (3.9) (6.0)
Haryana 1.1 [8] 2.6 [5] 2.8 [7] 7.2 [7] 13.7 [7] 14 [5]
(0.6) (1.5) (0.6) (3.0) (3.8) (6.0)
Karnataka 1.2 [4] 2.1 [14] 2.8 [7] 6.4 [14] 12.5 [16] 13 [13]
(0.7) (1.6) (0.5) (2.7) (3.7) (5.0)
Kerala 0.8 [16] 2.8 [3] 2.6 [16] 7.1 [10] 13.4 [11] 14 [5]
(0.7) (1.4) (0.8) (2.4) (3.3) (5.0)
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 1.2 [4] 2.3 [13] 2.9 [2] 8.2 [1] 14.6 [2] 15 [1]
(0.7) (1.6) (0.4) (2.3) (3.5) (6.0)
Maharashtra 1.2 [4] 2.8 [3] 2.7 [14] 7.5 [5] 14.3 [4] 15 [1]
(0.7) (1.4) (0.7) (2.5) (3.5) (5.0)
Orissa 1.1 [8] 2.6 [5] 2.8 [7] 6.4 [14] 12.9 [14] 13 [13]
(0.7) (1.5) (0.5) (2.9) (3.8) (6.0)
Punjab 1 [12] 2.6 [5] 2.9 [2] 7.2 [7] 13.6 [8] 14 [5]
(0.6) (1.4) (0.5) (2.7) (3.5) (6.0)
Rajastan 1 [12] 2 [15] 3 [1] 7.3 [6] 13.3 [13] 13 [13]
(0.7) (1.6) (0.3) (2.6) (3.5) (5.0)
Tamil Nadu (TN) 1 [12] 2.9 [2] 2.9 [2] 6.6 [13] 13.4 [11] 14 [5]
(0.6) (1.4) (0.5) (2.3) (3.0) (4.0)
West Bengal (WB) 1 [12] 2 [15] 2.7 [14] 7.8 [3] 13.5 [9] 14 [5]
(0.7) (1.6) (0.7) (2.6) (3.8) (6.0)
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 1.4 [1] 2.6 [5] 2.8 [7] 7.9 [2] 14.8 [1] 15 [1]
(0.7) (1.5) (0.6) (2.4) (3.3) (4.0)
North Eastern States 1.1 [8] 3.1 [1] 2.9 [2] 6.8 [11] 13.9 [5] 14 [5]
(0.6) (1.4) (0.4) (2.5) (3.2) (4.0)
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year
April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii)
Column [1]: sum of dummy variables based on questions laid out in Table 4; Column [2]: sum of dummy variables based on
questions laid out in Table 5; Column [3]: sum of dummy variables based on questions laid out in Table 6; Column [4]: sum
of dummy variables based on questions laid out in Table 7; Column [5]: addition of indices reported in Columns [1], [2], [3]
and [4].
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Table 8
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Conditional Probability of Entry into School: Main Coefficients from Models 1, 2, 2a and 3 (Standard Error)
AP KERALA UP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Female Autonomy - -0.044 0.024 -0.026 0.327 0.312 0.001 0.007 -0.017 1.315***
(0.098) (0.075) (0.076) (0.281) (0.250) (0.032) (0.052) (0.035) (0.066)
Female Autonomy * Girl - 0.130 0.078 0.206* -0.048 -0.057 -0.002 0.051 0.028 0.082***
(0.132) (0.106) (0.122) (0.389) (0.358) (0.045) (0.066) (0.048) (0.026)
Baseline Hazard:
Age Interval 6-7 0.040 0.028 -0.826 -1.053*** -0.694 -0.722 -1.255 -1.577** 0.410*** 0.398*** -0.353*** -0.784***
(0.467) (0.414) (0.529) (0.167) (1.155) (1.207) (0.852) (0.652) (0.150) (0.149) (0.113) (0.077)
Age Interval 7-8 0.392 0.366 -0.639 -1.014*** -2.041 -2.002 -2.592* -2.854** 1.442*** 1.423*** 0.239 -0.283***
(0.763) (0.676) (0.875) (0.280) (1.724) (1.708) (1.430) (1.267) (0.226) (0.223) (0.180) (0.104)
Age Interval 8-9 -1.936** -1.966** -2.931*** -3.291*** 1.378 1.465 0.896 0.665 1.817*** 1.794*** 0.335 -0.317**
(0.894) (0.820) (0.983) (0.495) (1.774) (1.798) (1.523) (1.347) (0.300) (0.297) (0.242) (0.154)
Age Interval 9-10 -2.680** -2.719** -3.695*** -4.040*** - - - - 0.582 0.555 -0.962** -1.816***
(1.326) (1.271) (1.388) (1.038) (0.504) (0.502) (0.454) (0.407)
Age Interval 10-11 - - - - - - - - 1.252 1.227 -0.427 -1.340
(1.241) (1.239) (1.191) (1.188)
Baseline Hazard * Girl:
Age Interval 6-7 -0.313 -0.315 -0.250 -0.283 2.011 1.987 1.858 1.818 0.077 0.077 0.069 0.232**
(0.301) (0.299) (0.274) (0.257) (1.427) (1.421) (1.375) (1.351) (0.132) (0.132) (0.113) (0.112)
Age Interval 7-8 -2.049*** -2.044*** -1.995*** -1.940*** - - - - -0.035 -0.036 -0.080 0.040
(0.585) (0.581) (0.574) (0.539) (0.171) (0.170) (0.149) (0.149)
Age Interval 8-9 - - - - - - - - -0.785*** -0.784*** -0.726*** -0.607***
(0.256) (0.255) (0.232) (0.233)
Age Interval 9-10 - - - - - - - - 0.406 0.410 0.415 0.753
(0.542) (0.541) (0.510) (0.512)
Age Interval 10-11 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Girl 0.447*** 0.450*** 0.367*** 0.454*** 0.239 0.190 0.134 0.225 -0.192** -0.189** -0.112* -0.451***
(0.162) (0.158) (0.131) (0.124) (0.422) (0.438) (0.401) (0.371) (0.081) (0.080) (0.059) (0.072)
Constant 1.584*** 1.616*** 1.025*** 0.695*** 1.915 2.017 1.630 1.587 -0.741*** -0.740*** -0.515*** 1.212***
(0.483) (0.485) (0.346) (0.032) (1.469) (1.550) (1.079) (0.852) (0.222) (0.220) (0.153) (0.020)
Variance of the Mother
Level Random Effect
1.772***
(0.340)
1.789***
(0.335) - -
1.080
(0.933)
1.103
(1.097) - -
1.508***
(0.106)
1.500***
(0.104) - -
Number of mothers 1.737 1.737 1.737 1.737 842 842 842 842 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160
Number of children 2.419 2.419 2.419 2.419 1.051 1.051 1.051 1.051 6.510 6.510 6.510 6.510
Log Likelihood 1321.17 -1320.66 -1347.59 -26907.18 -149.95 -148.34 -148.78 -502.34 -6402.17 -6230.47 -6401.99 -30501.09
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) the dependent variable is the dummy whether child enters
school and the reference case for the baseline hazard is the normal entry at age 6. (iii) Model 1: duration specification without female autonomy variable; Model 2: duration specification with female
autonomy indices, Model 3: structural equation model specification. (iv) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; (v) Log likelihood values for Model 3 are not comparable to the other Model values. (vi) ---
coefficient estimates too small to report. (vii) The remaining coefficient estimates are reported in Appendix 2 Table A2.2.
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Table 9
Estimates of the Regression of Female Autonomy
on Female Characteristics, Equation 5 (Standard Errors)
FEMALE AUTONOMY AP KERALA UP
Ma: Belongs to Schleduled Caste 1 1 1
Ma: Belongs to Scheduled Tribe 0.705*** -0.265 1.634***
(0.198) (0.674) (0.587)
Ma: Belongs to Other Backw. Caste 0.630*** 0.101 0.104***
(0.104) (0.256) (0.037)
Ma: Muslim 0.737*** -0.165 0.487***
(0.136) (0.209) (0.106)
Ma: Completed Primary Educ or More 0.559*** 1.439*** 0.387***
(0.100) (0.563) (0.101)
Ma: Birth Cohort 1968 – 1972 -0.933*** 0.184 -1.056***
(0.173) (0.398) (0.298)
Ma: Birth Cohort 1973 – 1977 -0.713*** -0.376 -1.745***
(0.149) (0.465) (0.309)
Ma: Birth Cohort 1978 – 1982 -1.140*** -0.096 -1.569***
(0.131) (0.167) (0.349)
Ma: Birth Cohort 1983 – 1991 -1.321*** -0.598*** -1.834***
(0.151) (0.101) (0.509)
Rural -0.575*** 0.108 -0.634***
(0.106) (0.283) (0.101)
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year April
2005. (ii) Correlations between the scheduled caste dummy and the spheres have been set to one for identification. (iv) *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 10
Estimates of Regression of Sub-Spheres on Female Autonomy (Standard Error)
Dependent Variable: AP KERALA UP
Economic Autonomy 1 1 1
Decision-Making Autonomy 0.863*** 0.298 -0.734***
(0.024) (0.252) (0.101)
Physical Autonomy 0.124** 0.044 0.108
(0.061) (0.098) (0.198)
Emotional Autonomy 1.627*** 0.356 0.451***
(0.041) (0.305) (0.102)
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the
academic year April 2005. (ii) Estimates are derived from Regression of sub-spheres on concept of female
autonomy (8). (iii) Coefficient of female autonomy on economic autonomy has been set equal to one for
identification (iv) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 11
Simulated Cumulative School Enrolment Probabilities
AP Kerala UP
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Autonomy = 0
Autonomy =
mean + 2 std dev Autonomy = 0
Autonomy =
mean + 2 std dev Autonomy = 0
Autonomy =
mean + 2 std dev
Age 6 0.821 0.825 0.994 0.997 0.587 0.607
Age 7 0.896 0.897 0.994 0.998 0.689 0.710
Age 8 0.920 0.921 0.994 0.999 0.775 0.796
Age 9 0.921 0.922 0.996 0.999 0.809 0.830
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic
year April 2005. (ii) Simulations based on Model 3 (Structural Equation Model).(iii) All covariates are evaluated at
their sample means. (iv) In columns [1], [3] and [5] latent factor of female autonomy is evaluated at zero (which
corresponds to the mean) (v) In columns [2], [4] and [6] the latent factor of female autonomy is evaluated at two
(which corresponds to a two standard deviation increase from the mean).
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Appendices:
Appendix 1
1. Economic Autonomy:
 m1: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either herself or jointly with her husband on what to
do with her husband’s money.
 m2: takes the value of 1 if the woman has money of her own that she alone can decide how to use.
2. Physical Autonomy:
 m3: takes the value of 1 if the woman is allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to the
market.
 m4: takes the value of 1 if the woman is allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to the
health clinic.
 m5: takes the value of 1 if the woman is allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to places
outside the community.
3. Decision-making Autonomy:
 m6: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either alone or jointly with her husband on her own
health care.
 m7: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either alone or jointly with her husband on small
household purchases.
 m8: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either alone or jointly with her husband on large
household purchases.
 m9: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either alone or jointly with her husband on visiting
family and friends.
4. Emotional Autonomy:
 m10: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she argues
with him.
 m11: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she is
disrespectful.
 m12: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she goes
out without telling him.
 m13: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if he
suspects her of being unfaithful.
 m14: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she
neglects house or children.
 m15: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she
refuses to have sex with him.
 m16: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she does
not cook the food properly.
 m17: takes the value of 1 if the woman believes she is justified in refusing sex if husband has
sexually transmitted disease.
 m18: takes the value of 1 if the woman believes she is justified in refusing sex if husband has other
women.
 m19: takes the value of 1 if the woman believes she is justified in refusing sex if she is tired.
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The Outcome Model – linear predictor for mother j (equation (7))
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Notes: The variables 11 to 410 are the linear predictors for the binary indicators associated with the measurements m1 to m19
laid out above.
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Appendix 2
Table A2.1
Logistic Regression for the Probability of Dropping out of Primary School
Coefficient Estimates (Standard Errors)
Variable Urban Rural No. of
Children
No. of
Mothers
States Urban Rural No. of
Children
No. of
Mothers
All India SSA 0.257*** 0.138*** 41,282 28,610 Maharashtra 0.371*** 0.318*** 4,691 2,147
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
SSA*girl 0.017 0.046*** 0.088** 0.083*
(0.286) (0.001) (0.013) (0.064)
AP SSA -0.136 0.148 3,519 1,728 Orissa 0.407*** 0.281*** 2,267 1,017
(0.383) (0.180) (0.002) (0.001)
SSA*girl -0.011 0.174*** 0.009 -0.009
(0.856) (0.001) (0.859) (0.799)
Bihar SSA -0.203 0.204* 2,325 808 Punjab 0.694** 0.251** 2,191 952
(0.523) (0.069) (0.047) (0.042)
SSA*girl -0.102 -0.005 -0.173 0.107*
(0.545) (0.913) (0.203) (0.051)
Gujarat SSA 0.365** 0.0952 2,019 889 Rajasthan 0.365** 0.116 2,665 1,008
(0.023) (0.434) (0.020) (0.159)
SSA*girl 0.045 0.105** 0.092 0.109***
(0.502) (0.045) (0.201) (0.005)
Haryana SSA -0.0339 0.323** 1,861 769 TN 0.506*** 0.260* 2,532 1,349
(0.916) (0.011) (0.008) (0.079)
SSA*girl -0.111 0.068 0.066 0.175**
(0.499) (0.283) (0.360) (0.013)
Karnataka SSA 0.365 0.0437 2,894 1,359 WB 0.797*** 0.384*** 3,289 1,629
(0.104) (0.781) (0.001) (0.001)
SSA*girl 0.034 0.101* 0.008 -0.130***
(0.705) (0.094) (0.925) (0.005)
Kerala SSA 1.240* 0.848*** 1,479 815 UP 0.228*** 0.0747 8,390 2,848
(0.065) (0.005) (0.002) (0.168)
SSA*girl -0.326 -0.009 0.0277 0.036
(0.213) (0.944) (0.459) (0.160)
MP SSA 0.295* 0.192* 3,662 1,531 NE 0.366*** 0.233*** 10,331 4,150
(0.096) (0.076) (0.001) (0.001)
SSA*girl 0.038 0.110** -0.074 0.042
(0.594) (0.018) (0.182) (0.139)
Notes: (i) The above model is estimated using the sample of children aged 6-11 at the interview time. SSA is the actual School-Starting
Age and SSA*girl refers to the interaction with the gender dummy. (ii) North-Eastern states are: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland,
Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A2.2
Estimates of Remaining Coefficients from Models [1], [2] and [3]
(Standard Error)
AP KERALA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Female Autonomy - -0.044 0.024 -0.026 0.327 0.312 0.001
(0.098) (0.075) (0.076) (0.281) (0.250) -0.032
Female Autonomy *
Girl - 0.130 0.078 0.206* -0.048 -0.057 -0.002
(0.132) (0.106) (0.122) (0.389) (0.358) -0.045
Caste:
Scheduled Caste -0.207 -0.205 -0.163 -0.080 -0.526 -0.545 -0.540 -0.401
(0.269) (0.267) (0.214) (0.172) (0.669) (0.661) (0.597) (0.545)
Scheduled Tribe -1.016*** -1.019*** -0.781*** -0.738*** -2.521** -2.494* -2.103** -1.961**
(0.375) (0.365) (0.262) (0.192) (1.262) (1.285) (0.969) (0.818)
Other Backward Caste -0.406* -0.402* -0.336** -0.232* -0.443 -0.443 -0.381 -0.112
(0.224) (0.221) (0.171) (0.130) (0.466) (0.468) (0.422) (0.390)
Religion:
Muslim -0.968*** -0.970*** -0.704*** -0.687*** -0.081 0.035 0.061 0.079
(0.324) (0.302) (0.224) (0.141) (0.503) (0.506) (0.469) (0.444)
Highest Education:
Ma: Completed Prim. 0.385* 0.386* 0.282* 0.283** 1.917*** 1.793*** 1.643*** 1.568***
(0.205) (0.200) (0.149) (0.129) (0.616) (0.602) (0.494) (0.448)
Pa: Completed Prim. 0.373* 0.359* 0.287** 0.272** 1.244** 1.162** 1.057** 1.082**
(0.190) (0.184) (0.135) (0.114) (0.558) (0.540) (0.454) (0.421)
Pa: Completed Sec. 1.202*** 1.194*** 0.960*** 0.989*** 1.952** 1.726* 1.647* 1.516*
(0.353) (0.342) (0.284) (0.240) (0.947) (0.940) (0.887) (0.859)
Wealth:
2nd Quintile 0.415 0.395 0.265 0.366** 0.467 0.520 0.589 0.966
(0.338) (0.333) (0.233) (0.175) (1.317) (1.288) (1.078) (0.774)
3rd Quintile 0.662** 0.641** 0.430* 0.521*** 1.350 1.351 1.222 1.561**
(0.327) (0.320) (0.226) (0.153) (1.306) (1.259) (1.046) (0.736)
4th Quintile 0.698** 0.685** 0.513** 0.561*** 0.370 0.404 0.364 0.725
(0.343) (0.340) (0.240) (0.158) (1.194) (1.159) (0.966) (0.604)
5th Quintile 1.206*** 1.170*** 0.927*** 0.945*** -0.104 -0.113 -0.106 0.180
(0.435) (0.422) (0.312) (0.206) (1.253) (1.219) (1.029) (0.691)
Rural Household 0.443** 0.439** 0.376** 0.393*** -0.405 -0.374 -0.369 -0.230
(0.217) (0.214) (0.168) (0.117) (0.482) (0.467) (0.431) (0.373)
Child Characteristics:
Girl 0.447*** 0.450*** 0.367*** 0.454*** 0.239 0.190 0.134 0.225
(0.162) (0.158) (0.131) (0.124) (0.422) (0.438) (0.401) (0.371)
Birth Order = 2 0.312* 0.306* 0.271* 0.277** 0.272 0.260 0.259 0.217
(0.176) (0.172) (0.146) (0.120) (0.456) (0.456) (0.424) (0.409)
Birth Order = 3 0.234 0.235 0.184 0.208 0.897 0.859 0.840 0.882
(0.192) (0.189) (0.154) (0.136) (0.739) (0.731) (0.671) (0.646)
Birth order > 3 -0.060 -0.058 -0.015 -0.026 1.014 0.950 0.950 0.967
(0.205) (0.203) (0.155) (0.138) (0.768) (0.758) (0.676) (0.625)
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Table A2.2 Continued
AP KERALA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Initial Conditions:
Aged 6 in 2003 -0.172 -0.177 -0.118 -0.131 -0.261 -0.255 -0.213 -0.156
(0.166) (0.165) (0.136) (0.126) (0.506) (0.504) (0.457) (0.435)
Aged 6 in 2004 -0.349** -0.350** -0.264* -0.262** 0.293 0.303 0.290 0.494
(0.178) (0.176) (0.146) (0.132) (0.562) (0.557) (0.514) (0.528)
Aged 6 in 2005 -1.506*** -1.514*** -1.173*** -1.069*** 0.619 0.602 0.553 0.636
(0.380) (0.362) (0.292) (0.199) (1.203) (1.181) (1.100) (1.078)
Baseline Hazard:
Age Interval 6-7 0.040 0.028 -0.826 -1.053*** -0.694 -0.722 -1.255 -1.577**
(0.467) (0.414) (0.529) (0.167) (1.155) (1.207) (0.852) (0.652)
Age Interval 7-8 0.392 0.366 -0.639 -1.014*** -2.041 -2.002 -2.592* -2.854**
(0.763) (0.676) (0.875) (0.280) (1.724) (1.708) (1.430) (1.267)
Age Interval 8-9 -1.936** -1.966** -2.931*** -3.291*** 1.378 1.465 0.896 0.665
(0.894) (0.820) (0.983) (0.495) (1.774) (1.798) (1.523) (1.347)
Age Interval 9-10 -2.680** -2.719** -3.695*** -4.040***
(1.326) (1.271) (1.388) (1.038)
Age Interval 10-11 0 0 0 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Baseline Hazard *
Girl:
Age Interval 6-7 -0.313 -0.315 -0.250 -0.283 2.011 1.987 1.858 1.818
(0.301) (0.299) (0.274) (0.257) (1.427) (1.421) (1.375) (1.351)
Age Interval 7-8 -2.049*** -2.044*** -1.995*** -1.940***
(0.585) (0.581) (0.574) (0.539)
Constant 1.584*** 1.616*** 1.025*** 0.695*** 1.915 2.017 1.630 1.587
(0.483) (0.485) (0.346) (0.032) (1.469) (1.550) (1.079) (0.852)
Mother Level
Random Effect 1.772*** 1.789*** - - 1.080 1.103 - -
(0.340) (0.335) (0.933) (1.097)
Log Likelihood 1321.17 -1320.66 -1347.59 -26907.18 -149.95 -148.34 -148.78 -502.34
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Table A2.2 Continued
UP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Female Autonomy 0.007 -0.017 1.315***
(0.052) (0.035) (0.066)
Female Autonomy * Girl 0.051 0.028 0.082***
(0.066) (0.048) (0.026)
Caste:
Scheduled Caste 0.024 0.019 -0.002 -0.691***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.088) (0.067)
Scheduled Tribe 0.269 0.341 0.393 -1.293***
(0.790) (0.684) (0.282) (0.233)
Other Backward Caste -0.131 -0.132 -0.175** -0.661***
(0.110) (0.109) (0.071) (0.055)
Religion:
Muslim -0.992*** -0.989*** -0.664*** -1.014***
(0.124) (0.124) (0.081) (0.058)
Highest Education:
Ma: Completed Prim. 0.450*** 0.442*** 0.353*** 0.075
(0.115) (0.115) (0.076) (0.071)
Pa: Completed Prim. 0.681*** 0.678*** 0.434*** 0.331***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.061) (0.053)
Pa: Completed Sec. 1.272*** 1.262*** 0.874*** 0.762***
(0.166) (0.166) (0.107) (0.096)
Wealth:
2nd Quintile 0.264** 0.263** 0.224*** -0.107*
(0.116) (0.115) (0.072) (0.062)
3rd Quintile 0.599*** 0.595*** 0.414*** -0.064
(0.137) (0.135) (0.085) (0.071)
4th Quintile 0.610*** 0.605*** 0.475*** -0.145*
(0.151) (0.150) (0.099) (0.077)
5th Quintile 1.680*** 1.668*** 1.180*** 0.229**
(0.211) (0.209) (0.139) (0.103)
Rural Household 0.419*** 0.431*** 0.343*** 0.126**
(0.134) (0.135) (0.095) (0.054)
Child Characteristics:
Girl -0.192** -0.189** -0.112* -0.451***
(0.081) (0.080) (0.059) (0.072)
Birth Order = 2 0.004 0.003 0.034 -0.564***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.078) (0.073)
Birth Order = 3 -0.095 -0.098 -0.052 -0.479***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.080) (0.061)
Birth order > 3 0.030 0.029 0.026 0.373***
(0.100) (0.099) (0.069) (0.061)
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Table A2.2 Continued
UP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Initial Conditions:
Aged 6 in 2003 0.760*** 0.755*** 0.525*** 0.479***
(0.097) (0.096) (0.069) (0.071)
Aged 6 in 2004 0.893*** 0.889*** 0.605*** -0.130
(0.109) (0.108) (0.079) (0.127)
Aged 6 in 2005 -0.054 -0.054 -0.019 -0.348***
(0.173) (0.172) (0.130) (0.057)
Baseline Hazard:
Age Interval 6-7 0.410*** 0.398*** -0.353*** -0.784***
(0.150) (0.149) (0.113) (0.077)
Age Interval 7-8 1.442*** 1.423*** 0.239 -0.283***
(0.226) (0.223) (0.180) (0.104)
Age Interval 8-9 1.817*** 1.794*** 0.335 -0.317**
(0.300) (0.297) (0.242) (0.154)
Age Interval 9-10 0.582 0.555 -0.962** -1.816***
(0.504) (0.502) (0.454) (0.407)
Age Interval 10-11 1.252 1.227 -0.427 -1.340
(1.241) (1.239) (1.191) (1.188)
Baseline Hazard * Girl:
Age Interval 6-7 0.077 0.077 0.069 0.232**
(0.132) (0.132) (0.113) (0.112)
Age Interval 7-8 -0.035 -0.036 -0.080 0.040
(0.171) (0.170) (0.149) (0.149)
Age Interval 8-9 -0.785*** -0.784*** -0.726*** -0.607***
(0.256) (0.255) (0.232) (0.233)
Age Interval 9-10 0.406 0.410 0.415 0.753
(0.542) (0.541) (0.510) (0.512)
Age Interval 10-11
Constant -0.741*** -0.740*** -0.515*** 1.212***
(0.222) (0.220) (0.153) (0.020)
Mother Level Random
Effect 1.508*** 1.500*** - -
(0.106) (0.104)
Log Likelihood -6402.17 -6230.47 -6401.99 -30501.09
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of
the academic year April 2005. (ii) Model 1: duration specification without female autonomy variable;
Model 2: duration specification with female autonomy indices; Model 3: structural equation model
specification. (iii) Dependent Variable in Columns [1], [2] and [3]: Dummy for child entering school
- SSA; (iv) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. (v) Models allow for unobserved heterogeneity at the
child-, mother- and district-levels.
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2Abstract
This paper makes a significant contribution on both conceptual and methodological
fronts, in the analysis of the effect of maternal autonomy on school enrolment age of
children in India. The school entry age is modelled using a discrete time duration model
where maternal autonomy is entered as a latent characteristic, and allowed to be
associated with various parental and household characteristics which also conditionally
affect school entry age. The model identification is achieved by using proxy measures
collected in the third round of the National Family Health Survey of India, on
information relating to the economic, decision-making, physical and emotional
autonomy of a woman. We concentrate on three very different states in India – Andhra
Pradesh, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. Our results indicate that female autonomy is not
associated with socio-economic characteristics of the woman or her family in Kerala
(except maternal education), while it is strongly correlated to these characteristics in
both Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. Secondly, while female autonomy is
significant in influencing the school starting age in UP, it is less important in AP and
not significant at all in Kerala.
Keywords: Latent Factor Models; Structural Equation Models; Female Autonomy;
School Enrolment Decisions; India; National Family Health Survey.
JEL: I2, J12, C35
3Introduction
The vast literature on children’s education identifies a number of factors that influence
children’s educational inputs and outcomes including, for instance, parent’s education,
income levels, social norms and regional factors. One factor that has been considered
extensively in the context of other child welfare indicators, like health and child
mortality, but has been less extensively considered in the context of education is the
autonomy of women within the household. Academic researchers as well as policy
makers have long argued that female autonomy will help improve family welfare
because women are more altruistic in their decisions with regard to the family than men.
Intuitively, a woman’s autonomy is likely to affect the education of her children by
improving her bargaining power, her mobility and ability to collect and process
information regarding schooling and to act on this information. In this paper, we analyse
the impact of mother’s autonomy on children’s starting age in school in India.1
Although India has made impressive strides in improving its primary schooling record,
there is, however, still room for substantial improvement. Data from the UNICEF
(2009) suggest that an estimated 42 million children aged 6 to 10 are not in school. Our
analysis is based on the third round of the National Family Health Survey of India
(NFHS3).
The paper makes a significant contribution on both conceptual and
methodological fronts. It is innovative in the way in which it models child school entry
age as well as how female autonomy is conceptualised and treated in the model of
school entry. First, while most studies within the literature on education have
concentrated on enrolment and performance of children in school, in this paper, we
study the school starting age (SSA) which provides a new and interesting perspective.
To begin with, the SSA may be seen as an early indicator of the educational prospects
of the child because it encompasses considerable information relating to the interest
taken by parents in the child’s education, their priorities and the constraints they face. In
addition, different SSAs across children throw up a number of pedagogical challenges
since they imply that each class has children of different ages within it. Understanding
the factors that influence the SSA therefore is very important from a policy point of
view. Modelling this, however, is not very straightforward and the paper makes a
1 We use the terms female autonomy, mother’s autonomy and women’s autonomy to mean the same
thing in our context.
4methodological innovation by modelling ‘entry into school’ in the context of duration
analysis. This approach allows us to address two issues – right censoring of data and the
initial conditions problem - that affect all analyses of this kind. The data is right
censored because of the presence of school-age children who have still not started
school in the sample. The initial conditions problem, on the other hand, arises because
children of different ages at the time of interview would have become eligible for
school admission at different times.
The second significant contribution of this paper is in the way in which we treat
and model the impact of female autonomy on school enrolment age. Female autonomy
is an end in itself and also an instrument to help achieve household welfare objectives.
While some authors have used proxies like female education, employment and wealth,
others have used direct responses to questions relating to women’s freedom and
decision-making power. The latter group of writers has in turn varied in its approach,
both using summary indices of responses to these questions and using the responses
separately. The concept of autonomy itself is intrinsically vague and faces two main
problems in empirical work. First, variables like education which are often used to
capture female autonomy have both a direct effect on the outcome variable (like child
education, child health or household consumption) and also an indirect effect via
autonomy. Secondly, proxies that are often used to measure autonomy do not perfectly
capture this concept and produce equations with covariates that are correlated with the
equation error term resulting in endogeneity problems.
In this paper, we attempt to allow for these problems by modelling female
autonomy as a latent trait which cannot be directly measured. To do this, we use the
NFHS3 dataset, which provides detailed information about the level of autonomy
experienced by women across all states and Union Territories in India. We assume that
the direct responses to questions relating to economic, decision-making, physical and
emotional autonomy of a woman provide only a proxy measure. In addition, we allow
the latent autonomy trait to be correlated with a number of socio-economic factors
pertaining to the woman herself, her partner and the household she lives in. The
approach used here is borrowed from the ‘Item Response Theory’ which is routinely
used in socio-psychometric studies (Zheng and Rabe-Hesketh, 2007; DeBoeck and
5Wilson, 2004; for instance).2 This methodology improves on past studies in two
significant ways. First, it allows us to separate the direct effects of important covariates
in the model from their indirect effects, which work through the impact of these factors
on female autonomy. Second, our approach allows us to deal with the possible
endogeneity of these covariates in the model, due to their correlation with unobservable
factors such as autonomy.
We present within-state analysis for three contrasting states in India – Kerala (a
progressive, relatively developed state), Andhra Pradesh (one of India’s Southern states,
often considered to be the median state in India) and Uttar Pradesh (a North Indian state
which is traditionally seen as having relatively low levels of female autonomy) (Dreze
and Sen, 1996). We also compare our results across states in an attempt to consider how
patterns vary.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 lays out the research questions
motivating the present analysis. Section 2 describes the issues connected to primary
education in India and Section 3 explains the concepts and issues of female autonomy.
Section 4 describes the data, measurements and summary statistics. The econometric
methodology is laid out in Section 5, the results of which are outlined in Section 6.
Section 7 discusses the implications and concludes.
1. Research Questions
This paper concentrates on two main questions – what role does mother’s autonomy
play in determining the school starting age and what factors are related to mother’s
autonomy in their turn?
The age at which children start school, has caused considerable debate in public
discourse (see Elder and Lubotsky, 2007; Cascio and Schanzenbach, 2007; Black et al.
(2008). This literature is of limited relevance for us because it covers relatively
developed countries where school enrolment ages vary only at the margin as a result of
children being born in different months of the same year. In many developing countries,
by contrast, the variation is considerable with starting ages varying by years (as we see
in Table 1) and some children never entering school. Such late enrolment delays the
2 Our approach is similar to the one used by previous studies scrutinising cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities (Hansen et al., 2004; Heckman et al., 2006; for instance) although there are some
fundamental differences which we point out later.
6accumulation of human capital and also decreases its expected lifetime amount. Angrist
and Krueger (1991), for instance, show that earlier enrolment increases lifetime
earnings. In such a context, the SSA could be considered as an early indicator of child
welfare and adult labour market performance. Both absence from school and the
possibility that children are working instead, have welfare implications for the child. In
addition, a child’s late start at school might be indicative of the time and money
constraints that its parents face as well as the priority they place on education.
The factors that influence the SSA and the impact that mother’s autonomy has
on it are the central issue dealt with in this paper. Female autonomy in our study, as in
many others, can be seen as the ability of women to be independent in four areas –
emotional, decision-making, physical and economic autonomy. Emotional autonomy
indicates how independent the woman feels from her husband while decision-making
autonomy measures the extent to which the woman is involved in the decision-making
process of the household. Physical autonomy denotes how much freedom the woman
has to move around and economic autonomy quantifies the woman's control over her
own finances.
Female autonomy might be expected to have an impact on the SSA because it
reflects the ability of the woman to make independent decisions. As indicated in the
introduction, we do not need to accept that mothers are more altruistic than fathers for
this impact to hold. Having two adults, both of whom are able to work effectively in the
interests of the child is likely to be more advantageous for the child than having a single
adult (with his/her attendant time and incentive constraints) responsible for its welfare.
Even when parents are aware of the importance of schooling and convinced about the
returns from education, they may not have the information or the logistical ability to do
all that is necessary to send children to school. Given the male bread-winner model that
is common in India, fathers rarely have the time or the inclination to obtain and process
information relating to schooling. While mothers within this system might have the
time, they may not have the freedom to interact with others, obtain information and act
on it if they live under very restrictive social norms that dictate what women can and
cannot do. The autonomy of mothers in this context can be crucial. Women with greater
autonomy have greater physical mobility and are better able to network freely and
obtain information about schools. They may also be able to act on this information
better than mothers who are very dependent because they are able to visit schools, speak
7with teachers, take children to/from schools, buy books etc. Both physical and decision-
making autonomy are important in this respect.
Finally, mothers with economic autonomy also have economic freedom and this
helps them to prioritise schooling, if they wish. On the other hand, female autonomy
might increase the mother’s employment and if this keeps her very busy, she might
prefer to put off child schooling for as long as possible. In this case, some aspects of
female autonomy would actually worsen the school starting age of children.
Before we empirically analyse the role of female autonomy on the SSA, we will
consider the institutional background for schooling in India next.
2. Primary Education in India
In India, the prescribed age of starting primary school is 6 years. For children aged 6-11
in our data at the time of the interview, the school starting age distribution by major
states, is given in Table 1. We can see that while a significant number of children start
school between 6 and 8 years, there is no single entry point into education in India. The
‘more developed’ states like Kerala have a smaller window in which children enter
school while for AP and UP, this window lasts from 6-8 years and 6-9 years
respectively. Thus, 97% of children at school started at the age of 6 in Kerala, the
corresponding figure for UP is 57% and for AP is 81%.
In India, children who start late begin at the beginning and enrol in Class 1. So,
it is possible that if children start school at different ages, then there will be children of
different ages in each class, making the task of educating them more challenging. In
2004-2005, 14% of children in primary school were not in the right age group (District
Information System for Education, 2008a). Similarly, an estimated 6% of children in
primary schools and 9% in upper primary schools in 2004-2005 were over-aged (DISE,
2008b). The presence of over-aged children in primary education has become a point of
political interest in India, making our analysis in this paper more policy relevant.
In the context of the Millennium Development Goals, India’s flagship education
programme, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, set itself the goal of achieving universal
elementary education by 2010. Enrolling out of school children, enforcing the school
starting age and improving school quality are all crucial in achieving this objective. One
of the achievements of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan programme was that by March 2007
898% of the rural population had a school within one kilometre.3 Amongst the three
states we consider in this paper, Kerala benefited from being in Phase I of the District
Primary Education Programme (DPEP), a precursor to the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan put
forward in 1993/4. Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Uttar Pradesh (UP) were covered in Phase
II of the programme begun in 1997/8.
Thanks to programmes like the DPEP and the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, India's
primary schooling record has improved considerably with elementary enrolment
increasing by 3.2% per annum between 2000 and 2005. The net primary school
enrolment rate for boys was approximately 91% between 2005 and 2009 and
approximately 88% for girls (UNICEF, 2008). There is, however, still room for
improvement. According to the UNICEF (2010)4, for instance, an estimated 42 million
children aged 6 to 10 in India are still not attending school. Furthermore, gender
differences appear widespread, making an analysis of factors influencing schooling
crucial.
3. Female Autonomy: Concepts and Issues in the Literature
As indicated above, our main research question relates to the role played by female
autonomy in determining the age at which children enter school. The literature on the
interrelations between female autonomy and child education is relatively small (Basu
and Ray, 2002; Lancaster et al., 2006; Afridi, 2005; Durrant and Sathar, 2000; Smith
and Byron, 2005; and Aslam, 2007). However, the broader literature on autonomy has
much to contribute to our analysis in this paper. We will therefore situate the paper
within this broader literature.
Autonomy has been defined variously in the literature as ‘the ability to influence
and control one’s environment’ (Safilios-Rothschild, 1982), or the ‘capacity to obtain
information and make decisions about one’s private concerns and those of one’s
intimates’ (Dyson and Moore, 1983). Dixon-Mueller (1978) defines it as ‘the degree of
access to and control over material and social resources within the family, in the
community and in the society at large’. The term autonomy has often been confused
with empowerment, though the latter is a process and the former is the outcome (at least
partly) of the process. Our concern in this paper is with the outcome which determines
3 Government of India, Annual Report 2007–2008.
4 Webpage: unicef.org; accessed December 2010.
9women’s ability to make independent decisions. Attempts to measure female autonomy
have relied on two broad categories of variables: variables proxying autonomy through
women’s characteristics (her age, education and employment for example) and variables
reporting the woman's own perception of her status (relating to her freedom to make
decisions, associate with others and make choices).
As part of the first category of variables, Abadian (1996) uses female age at
marriage, age difference between husband and wife and female secondary education to
measure the impact of female autonomy on fertility. Others have used the educational
and economic condition of the woman at marriage5 as well as variables capturing the
woman's labour market experience.6 These reduced form measures do not allow us to
disentangle the direct influence of these variables on the outcome variable from those
indirect influences via their influence on autonomy.
In recent years, Demographic and Health Surveys have started collecting
information centred on the woman’s direct perceptions of her own autonomy. These
relate to whether women have to ask for permission to go out, whether they make
decisions relating to their children (how many to have, whether they should go to
school, whom they should marry etc.), and whether the woman decides what food or
other goods to buy.7 Although the information contained in these questions can give
important insights into the workings of female autonomy, it still remains far from clear
how it is to be translated into a measure of autonomy. Two approaches on how to use
the information contained in the woman’s responses are prominent.
The first approach focuses on specific dimensions of autonomy. This reflects the
rationale that female autonomy is context specific and that the importance of different
dimensions may vary from one setting to the next. These papers include the relevant
answers directly in their outcome model. Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001), for instance,
consider women’s autonomy in terms of freedom from violence, mobility, control over
resources and contribution to decision-making, while Vlassoff (1992), Jejeebhoy (2000)
as well as Morgan and Niraula (1995) consider three dimensions of autonomy (control
over resources, decision-making power and mobility). Chavoshi et al. (2004) use
distinct variables on mobility, decision-making access, control over resources and
5 See for example, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) and Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg (2002).
6 DeRose (2002) uses continuity of woman's work.
7 Information on gender preferences for children is another variable which is often used for measuring
the attitudes of the woman (Yount, Langsten and Hill, 2000).
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freedom from threat to analyse women's reproductive behaviour in Iran. A drawback of
this approach is in the underlying assumption that the answers to the questions provide a
perfect measure of the underlying unobserved autonomy trait.
The second approach employs summary indices constructed from answers to
questions mentioned above. For example, Hogan, Berhanu and Hailemariam (1999)
construct an index using questions on who purchases major items, consumption
patterns, resource allocation, joining a woman's club, sending children to school and age
at which girls should marry. Afridi (2005) also summarises the various aspects of
female autonomy into a single index as do Chakraborty and De (2011) who create an
index from the principal components of a variety of household variables on which the
mother of a child takes decisions. This approach, however, has also been criticised on
the grounds that it is too simplistic and ignores differences across measures (Agarwala
and Lynch (2007)). The addition of qualitative answers into a single index implies that
each answer is given an equal weight in determining a woman’s autonomy. There are
good reasons, however, to believe that some aspects of a woman’s life are more
important for her autonomy than others.
In summary, all measures of autonomy used to date have faced problems of
endogeneity of covariates in the model and/or of measurement errors. In this paper, we
take the multi-dimensionality of autonomy as a starting point and model female
autonomy as a latent factor that cannot be observed directly but will be assumed to
affect a number of measures which can be used to capture the autonomy trait
empirically.8,9 Common variation in these measurement variables will be used to infer
the properties of the latent factor of female autonomy which we assumed to be time
8 Both factor analysis (FA) as well as principal component analysis (PCA), tries to identify underlying
latent factors that help to explain correlations among a set of observable items. FA tries to capture this
data variability in terms of a number of unobservable or latent factors that are conceptualised as some
theoretical concepts. In contrast, extracted components in PCA which are uncorrelated with one
another are simple geometrical abstractions which may not map onto theoretical concepts. Our
analysis is a generalisation of factor analysis where we not only account for the binary nature of the
observables that are used to capture the common variations, but also control for the fact that some
underlying characteristics such as religion, caste and education can also explain the unobserved factor.
9 A list of variables is provided in Appendix 1.
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invariant – at least in the short run.10 In addition, we also allow the autonomy trait to be
correlated with covariates such as religion, caste and female education. This
methodology enables us to address the endogeneity of variables in the outcome equation
due to correlation with the unobserved autonomy trait.
Female Autonomy and its Impact on Child Schooling
While the autonomy of women is an outcome in itself, it is also the impact of this
autonomy on household welfare that has attracted much attention in the literature
(Hoddinott, 1992; Doss, 1996; Kabeer, 1994; Lundberg et al., 1997; Haddad and
Hoddinott, 1991). In this paper, we are particularly concerned with the impact on child
educational outcomes. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) and Afridi (2005) investigate
the effect of female autonomy on children's educational outcomes, defined as the
deviation of the highest grade attained by the child from the cohort mean. Chakraborty
and De (2011) find that the children of Mexican mothers with greater autonomy have
higher enrolment in and lower probability of dropping out of secondary school. Durrant
and Sathar (2000) find that although a higher status for individual women in Pakistan
enhances child survival and boys’ school attendance, community-level autonomy is
more important for improving the chances of girls attending school. Smith and Byron
(2005, studying four South Asian countries – Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan –
find that for South Asia as a whole, improving women’s autonomy is effective in
reducing gender discrimination against girls.
4. The Data, Summary Statistics and Measurements
The data used for the empirical analysis are taken from the third round of the National
Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) for India. The NFHS is part of the Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS) series conducted for about 70 low to middle income countries.11
The survey was conducted in 29 Indian states by the International Institute for
Population Sciences and Macro International (2007) and interviewed over 230,000
10 A number of studies has scrutinised how female autonomy is influenced by different factors. In this
literature female autonomy is considered as the dependent variable. Hashemi, Schuler and Riply
(1996), for example, find that the BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) and Grameen
Bank credit programmes significantly improve female autonomy in Bangladesh. Alternatively
Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001) examine whether differences in female autonomy are attributable to the
geographical location and the religion of the woman. Additionally Bloom, Wypij and Das Gupta
(2001) argued that close ties to kin increase female autonomy. This literature, however, is only of
limited relevance to our analysis. The impacts on female autonomy are likely to take a considerable
amount of time and we only consider a time span of six years.
11 The data are in the public domain and can be downloaded from www.measuredhs.com.
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women (aged 15-49) and men (aged 15-54) during the period December 2005 to August
2006. In common with the DHS, this survey collected extensive information on
population, health, and nutrition, with an emphasis on women and young children.
However, the survey also obtained information on schooling of all household members
such as the highest grade achieved, level of literacy and whether the household member
is still enrolled at school. In addition, information concerning household decision-
making as well as the ‘autonomy’ status of surveyed women was also collected.12
To fully exploit intra-state heterogeneity, we have conducted our analysis
separately for each state. Preliminary analyses were conducted on 15 major states of
India, though in this paper we concentrate on three states (Andhra Pradesh (AP), Kerala
and Uttar Pradesh (UP)) in order to keep the discussion focussed. AP, Kerala and UP
are interesting to analyse because they cover a range of conditions with regard to both
child welfare outcomes and female autonomy. First, while Kerala has very high rates of
school enrolment and adult literacy and education levels, UP has one of the lowest in
India. AP is in between these extremes and, on many measures, is often considered the
median state in India. Thus, in UP, 74% of boys and 64% of girls between 6-17 years
are enrolled in school, whereas it is 89% of boys and 90% of girls in Kerala. In AP,
77% of boys and 66% of girls aged 6 to 17 are enrolled in school.13 Again, while 1% of
children in Kerala never entered school in our sample, this figure is 8% in AP and 18%
in UP (Table 2). More crucially for our analysis, 69% of mothers in UP, 46% in AP and
only 3% in Kerala have never attended school (Table 2). In addition, while 16% of
women in Kerala have tertiary education, the figure for AP and UP is 6%. The
difference in mother’s education across the states is crucial because it could influence
child education both through its impact on autonomy and, more directly in terms of
parental preference for school enrolment. Second, these states also diverge significantly
in terms of their prosperity: in 2004/5, UP had a per capita GDP of Rs. 12198
approximately, whereas Kerala’s was two and half times as much at Rs. 29,065
approximately and AP was Rs.23755.14
Third, the three states have very different kinship systems that underlie family
relations and therefore determine the role of women within them. If India is divided into
12 Due to the protocols associated with the collection of HIV data, this round of the NFHS unfortunately,
did not provide any village level information or any district identifiers.
13 IPPS, DHS Final Report on India, 2005-06.
14 Government of India (2009), Economic Survey, 2008-09.
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three separate kinship systems (following Dyson and Moore, 1983) – the North Indian
System, the South Indian system and the East Indian System, UP is part of the North
Indian system and Kerala and AP of the South Indian system. Within the North Indian
kinship system, spouses are unrelated in terms of kinship, males co-operate with and
receive help only from other males to whom they are related by blood and women do
not inherit property. Such patriliny gives rise to the system of ‘purdah’ for women
which is supposed to enable them to maintain their honour, reputation and power. In
contrast, within the South Indian kinship system, spouses are often closely related
(cross-cousins) to each other; there are close socio-economic relations between males
who are related by blood and by marriage and women may inherit property. This results
in a system within which female movements are less rigidly controlled. Within the
South Indian system itself, Kerala and AP present two different cases. Kerala has a
broadly matrilineal system (though this is increasingly being eroded) within which
women have significant economic and social rights. AP, on the other hand, like most of
the rest of India has a patrilineal system, though its kinship system is broadly South
Indian. Once again, therefore, it falls between UP and Kerala. While our analysis
highlights intra-state differences in autonomy, it will also be interesting to compare how
our results vary across states.
Female Autonomy in India
As is common with the DHS, the Indian NFHS also elicited responses to certain
questions that may be interpreted as providing information on various aspects of
autonomy enjoyed by the woman. The questions have commonly been grouped into
four spheres of autonomy: economic, decision-making, physical and emotional
autonomy. Details of the questions used in the model are included in Appendix 1.
Information on economic autonomy in this dataset is captured through questions
relating to whether the woman has a say about what should be done with her husband’s
money and whether she has money for her own use. Table 3 presents summary
measures for the responses to these questions. In what follows, we will consider these
measures for the three states we concentrate on in this paper. About two-thirds of
women at the All-India level (71%) have some say in what happens to the money of
their husband. In comparison, this figure is 80% in UP, 56% in AP and 61% in Kerala.
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A lower percentage, 45%, of women in India have money for their own use and the
corresponding figures are 22% in Kerala, 59% in AP and 65% in UP.
To capture their decision making autonomy, women were asked whether they
decided jointly with their husbands on a number of household matters. These included
decisions relating to health care, to small and large household purchases and to visits to
family and friends. Summary measures for these aspects of decision-making autonomy
are reported in Table 4. For the whole of India 70% of women have a say on their own
health care and 68% on small and 60% on large household purchases. For the whole
country, 67% of women had a say in visiting family and friends. UP is at or above the
All-India average on all indicators except the decision to visit family and friends. Kerala
too is at or above the All-India average on all four decisions though marginally lower on
the purchase of small household items. AP is lower than the All-India average on all
four measures.
Three variables are employed to measure the extent of the woman’s physical
autonomy. These indicate whether the woman is allowed to go to a health facility, the
market and places outside the community. More than 90% of women across all states
enjoy all of these freedoms though again, UP women seem to fare the best, followed by
those from AP and finally from Kerala. The respective figures are reported in Table 5.
Finally, emotional autonomy is captured by considering questions on physical
violence and sexual relations within the household. Again, UP women fare better than
the All-India average on all 10 of these questions whereas in the case of Kerala and
Andhra women, emotional autonomy varies according to the question being asked.
Summary measures of the responses to these questions can be found in Table 6.
As mentioned earlier, many studies aggregate qualitative responses into indices.
For the purposes of comparison, we also present aggregate responses for each
dimension and the overarching concept of autonomy are reported in Table 7. The index
for female autonomy takes a maximum value of 19 and an average of 13.8 for the All-
India sample. The mean value for AP is 12.8 with a standard deviation of 4.0.
Compared to All-India average and dispersion, AP has a lower mean and also higher
dispersion. The average for Kerala is much closer to the All-India average.
Interestingly, the UP average is higher and also the distribution of the index is much
less dispersed relative to the All-India index. Given the complexity of the concepts
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concerned, we do not pool our analysis to use cross-state variations. Instead, we
concentrate on within-state variations.
5. Econometric Methodology
Our estimation methodology uses survival analysis in which female autonomy is treated
as a latent construct which is allowed to be correlated with the covariates in the
equation. The main variable of interest is the age at which the child entered primary
school. In survival analysis terminology, a child here is transiting from the state “out of
school” into the state “in school”. The time a child spends without entering school from
the prescribed start-age (usually 6) is the duration we are interested in. Starting age is
recorded with respect to the Indian academic year, which is the 1st of April, and is
recorded in years. We use a discrete time hazard framework and restrict our analysis to
a sample of children between 6 and 11 years at the time of the interview. If a child has
not started school at the time of the interview the duration is coded as censored.
All durations are measured with respect to age 6. For example, if a child is
observed to enter school at age 8, the duration for this child will be recorded as 3 years.
This implies an observable window of duration equal to a maximum of six years. All
children entering school at age 6 will be recorded to have duration of one.
The discrete time hazard hk for the kth interval (k=1,..,6) denotes the conditional
probability of a child entering school in the kth interval conditional on not having
enrolled in school before,
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In the above specification, d denotes the age at which the child i in family j enters
school where the entry age is measured with respect to age 6. In the case of a child who
is not observed to enter the school, i.e. the probability of an incomplete spell of d years,
is given by
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The above model consisting of equations (2) and (3) can be recast in terms of a binary
choice model by observing that each child will have multiple observations (Allison,
1982). Since the observation window is age 6 to 11, each child will have a set of up to
six binary indicators taking the value of 0, continuously in all years, starting from age 6
until s/he enters school when the binary indicator will take the value of 1. If an
observation is censored, that is if the child is not observed to enter school during the
observation window, the child will only have a series of 0s. To provide an example, first
consider a child who is aged 8 at the time of the interview and who entered school at the
age of 6. This child will have one observation recording a value of 1 as the child
entered aged 6. Take another child who is also aged 8 but has not entered school by the
time of the interview. This child will have three observations (one for each year starting
from 6 to 8) recording a value of 0 for every observation. A child who is 11 at the time
of the interview and not observed to enter school will have six observations all
recording a value of 0. The last two cases provide an example of a case where the
durations are censored.
In summary, given the above discussion, there will be a set of 0s and 1s for each
child in the family. The length of this column vector will depend on the age at which
the child entered school and also whether the time to starting the school is censored or
not.
For child i with mother j, we assume h(k) to be a logit
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ijx is a vector of observable child and family specific characteristics (to be discussed
later) that influence hij(k) and  is the vector of parameters associated with ijx . k is the
interval specific intercept that informs us about the shape of the hazard. The autonomy
status of the mother is )3(Fj and the effect of this on the hazard is Fwhichis known as
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the factor loading, is our parameter of interest.15 )2(Cij denotes the child specific
unobservable. The above specification is a multilevel hierarchical model where Level 1
refers to the age specific time intervals. Levels 2 and 3 refer to the child and mother
respectively. The superscripts indicate the level of the variable under consideration. In
addition, we also allow for an additional cluster at the district level which forms the 4th
level. However, we do not explicitly show this to keep the notation simpler.
As per our previous discussions, we do not use an aggregate index formed from
the set of answers given by the woman as measurement of female autonomy. Instead,
we assume that the latent trait of female autonomy is an exogenous cultural trait which
is correlated with the woman’s characteristics such as caste, religion, education, and
whether the woman lives in a rural household. In addition, we also allow this latent trait
to depend on when the woman was born. For mother j, this is specified as
FjjFj z  
)3( (5)
Next we assume that the unobserved female autonomy trait ( )3(Fj ) affects a
number of different but interrelated aspects of the woman’s life. Based on the form in
which the data has been made available and also on the approach taken by researchers
in the past, we consider four categories or spheres of autonomy: economic, decision-
making, physical, and emotional autonomy and specify the relationship between these
spheres of autonomy ( )3(lj with l=1,..,4) and
)3(
Fj as
ljFjllj  
)3()3( (6)
The assumption here is that variations in these four spheres can be used to say
something about the overarching concept of female autonomy that is also unobserved.
Since the spheres of autonomy are likely to be correlated with one another we allow for
correlations in the error terms ( lj ).
The last part of our model links the answers given by the woman to different
spheres of autonomy in order to generate the necessary variations to use in equation (6).
Intuitively, this can be pictured as follows: each of the four autonomy-spheres cannot be
observed directly but is captured by a set of nineteen fallible measures (given by the
15 For identification and facilitating inter-state comparisons the variance of female autonomy is set equal
to one in the estimation.
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answers to a set of questions provided in Appendix 1). For each sphere, common
variation in these measurements is used to infer its properties. All nineteen
measurement variables are binary and we consequently specify the following linear
predictor for a logit link as
)3(
jjj   (7)
where j is a vector of intercepts and
)3(
j a vector of latent autonomy spheres
(economic autonomy, physical autonomy, decision-making autonomy, and emotional
autonomy). The matrix of coefficients  contains the factor loadings.
An important advantage of this specification is that it accommodates correlations
between the latent factor and female characteristics. Often female autonomy is modelled
as a random effect which is assumed to be uncorrelated with all covariates. There are,
however, good reasons to believe that the latent factor of female autonomy is not
independent of female characteristics (education, for instance). This would make any
estimator that does not account for this correlation, inconsistent. By contrast, equation
(5) allows us to explicitly incorporate the fact that female autonomy is correlated with a
sub-set of the covariates.
Appendix 1 provides further details of the full specifications and the restrictions
needed for identification. Figure 1 provides a simple representation of the path diagram
associated with the various relationships that are considered here.16
Estimation of the Model
Equations (4) to (7) form the basis of our model and they are estimated jointly using
maximum likelihood method under the assumption that is normally distributed.17
6. Results
The empirical analysis focuses on a sample of children aged 6 to 11 for the whole
country. For AP, the sample size is 2419 children born to 1737 mothers. The
16 The above model is slightly different to the model used in Hansen et al. (2004) and Heckman et al.
(2006), where they assume two underlying latent independent characteristics ‘cognitive’ and non-
cognitive’ abilities and relate these to test scores. These authors allow the test scores to be affected by
additional school level variables conditional on the latent variables. In contrast, in our model, we
allow the latent variables to be correlated with characteristics such as religion, caste etc. In addition,
we also link the female autonomy trait to the four sub-spheres and allow these to be correlated.
17 We use GLLAMM (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal and Pickles, 2004) in Stata (StataCorp., 1985) to
estimate the model parameters. The programme can be downloaded at gllamm.org.
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corresponding figures for Kerala are 1051 and 842 and for UP 6510 and 4160. The
model estimated allows a number of additional factors to influence children’s entry into
school. These comprise characteristics of the child, the mother, the father, the household
and the baseline hazard. The child’s characteristics are the sex of the child and the
number of older and younger brothers as well as sisters. Mother’s characteristics include
a dummy for whether she has completed primary school, her caste and her religion. The
father’s education is also controlled for. The household’s characteristics can affect its
member’s economic outcomes and are therefore included in the model. They encompass
an indicator variable for the wealth quintile the household belongs to and whether it is
situated in a rural area. Finally, interval specific indicators and indicators for the year
the child turned 6 are included. The former make up the baseline hazard and the latter
control for initial conditions. This is important as children born in different years would
have faced different environments at the time of entry into primary school. Mother
specific covariates are allowed to influence the overall concept of female autonomy.
We estimate four models. Model 1 analyses school entry without allowance for
female autonomy. This specification encompasses all the above-mentioned child-,
mother-, father- and household-specific factors. We do not include the female autonomy
variable but allow for mother level random effect. Models 2 and 2a, conversely model
female autonomy via an index constructed as a z-score using the sum of qualitative
answers provided by the woman. The original variable takes a maximum value of 19
and the means and standard deviations of the sub-spheres as well as the overall ‘female
autonomy’ variable, are reported in Table 7. Since the latent factor in Model 3 is
restricted to have zero mean and unit variance, we enter the aggregate autonomy index
in Model 2 as a z-score to facilitate comparison between the models. The approach used
in Model 2 corresponds to the usual way of capturing female autonomy. Model 1
includes a random intercept at the child-, mother- and district-level. Model 2 is
estimated once with the three aforementioned random intercepts (Model 2) and once
only with a random intercept at the child- and district-level (Model 2a).
Finally, Model 3 is our structural equation model specification summarised in
equations (4) to (7) where each sphere of female autonomy is captured by a number of
fallible measures. These spheres subsequently make up the overarching concept of
female autonomy, which in turn affects entry into school. Unlike in Models 2 and 2a,
the structural approach taken in Model 3, allows us to separate the direct and indirect
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effects coming through the effects on autonomy, of parental characteristics (Figure 1).
The socio-economic factors in this figure are represented by the vector zi and the arrow
to the latent factor of female autonomy indicates their influence on this concept. In
order to capture gender differences in the effect of female autonomy, this latent
construct is interacted with the girl dummy in the hazard equation.
6.1 Female Autonomy & School Starting Age
We present the coefficient estimates and the standard errors for our main variables of
interest: female autonomy and the baseline hazard variables in Table 8.18 Note, the
mother level random effect in Model 1, will pick up the effect of unobserved
‘autonomy’ characteristic as well as other omitted mother level factors. A comparison
of Models 2 and 2a will tell us something about how much of the mother-level variance
is being picked up by the aggregate index for female autonomy.19 In Model 3, the
mother level unobservable effect is picked up by the ‘autonomy’ variable. The estimates
of the variance of the mother-level random effect are reported at the bottom of Table
8.20 Significant unobserved heterogeneity is found in UP and AP (Models 1 and 2).21
Only Kerala shows no signs of such heterogeneity. Furthermore, the inclusion of the
aggregate index does not seem to help to capture this heterogeneity (Model 2).22 Despite
the inclusion of the z-score as an explanatory variable in Model 2, the variance of the
mother-level random effect is still significantly different from zero in these states. If the
index was properly capturing the unobserved heterogeneity, we would expect the
variance of mother level random effects to become insignificant once this variable is
added. Excluding the mother-level random effects in Model 2a (but leaving the Z score
in), does not make a significant difference to the results in any of the three states under
consideration. In addition, if the qualitative answers are fallible measures of the
underlying autonomy trait, the aggregate index will be correlated with the unobserved
18 The estimates for all other covariates are reported in Appendix 2 Table A2.2.
19 Note omitting the mother-level random component will not affect the consistency property of the
estimator (Robinson, 1982) except in the case where the mother-level random component is correlated
with one or more of the regressors. Model 3 allows for this correlation.
20 Note, one cannot identify the variance of the autonomy variable separately from that of the effect of
the autonomy in Models 1 and 2. The variance is restricted to be 1 in Models 2a and 3.
21 Same conclusion is drawn from a comparison of the maximised values of the log likelihood.
22 Models 1, 2 and 2a are not nested within Model 3 and thus not comparable with Model 3 in terms of
log likelihood values.
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autonomy variable and hence the estimator would be inconsistent in this model
invalidating our inference in Models 2 and 2a.23
In Kerala, both the effects of female autonomy and its interaction with the girl
dummy are insignificant. The estimates for UP paint a different picture. In models 1
and 2, mother level random effects are very significant in determining school entry. In
model 3 for UP, the female autonomy variable and its interaction with girls are both
highly significant. Our results indicate that, like UP, mother level random effects are
significant in AP with the size of the effect being larger in AP implying a higher
variation in the unobserved heterogeneity. When modelled as a latent variable in Model
3, however, there is only a marginally significant impact of female autonomy on school
entry of girls in AP. These results present an interesting contrast to expectations. In UP,
female autonomy is highly significant in influencing the SSA. In AP, it is marginally
significant and only for girls and in Kerala, it is not significant at all. In summary, once
allowance for correlation between covariates and female autonomy is allowed for, we
find significant female autonomy effect in UP only.
Comparing the results to Model 2 and Model 2a, we find that the use of the
aggregate index does not help explain school enrolment of children. As Agarwala and
Lynch (2007) pointed out, measuring female autonomy by employing indices is overly
simplistic. One of the major drawbacks is that every answer is given the same weight.
So, for instance, the woman having money for her own use is assumed to be as
important for female autonomy and for the final indicator (children’s education in our
case) as the woman’s freedom to decide what to purchase for the household.
Furthermore, aggregating qualitative answers provided by the woman ignores the fact
that different questions relate to different spheres, which in turn are interconnected. The
results of the present analysis imply that, by neglecting these details, a large part of the
effect of female autonomy is not captured. In other words, by not modelling the
complex relationships between the various measurements of autonomy as well as their
interrelations, the effect of female autonomy is attenuated. We discuss this issue further
in Section 7 of the paper.
23 This is similar to the reasoning that test scores used in traditional wage equation models to capture
unobserved ability will be correlated with omitted ability if the test scores are assumed to be fallible
measures of ‘ability’ (see for example Heckman et al. (2006)).
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Finally, we estimate that a two standard deviation increase in female autonomy
is associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in primary school enrolment by age
six in AP and in Kerala with 0.3 percentage points. In UP, by contrast, the difference in
enrolment rates is 2 percentage points, which implies that for every 1000 children in
UP, an extra 20 children would have been enrolled by age 6 which is the recommended
school starting age, if the mother’s autonomy level was higher by 2 standard deviations
from the mean.
Prima facie, the present findings suggest four conclusions. First, in situations
like Kerala where the social ‘norm’ for school entry at 6 years exists and is strong,
female autonomy (or any other household and parental characteristics) is not significant
in influencing school starting age. Of course, these results can also be interpreted as
indicating that when the norm for schooling is strong, there is little variation left for
covariates to explain. Secondly, in situations (like UP) where there is considerably more
variation in SSA, female autonomy is extremely significant in influencing school
starting age. Third, in states like AP, school entry at 6 years is not a norm and is
influenced by a number of factors including household wealth and religion. Fourth,
methodologically, we can also conclude that the impact of this variable would be
missed if we did not model it appropriately – allowing for variations across spheres of
autonomy, correlations with household characteristics and also interactions between
them – as we have done in Model 3.
6.2 School enrolment probability age profiles
We next turn to the age profile of the conditional probabilities of entering school as the
child gets older (conditioned on the child not having enrolled up to that point), ceteris
paribus. These are the k coefficients given in equation (6). We allow this to be
different for boys and girls. The results are reported in Table 8. The reference case is
entry at the recommended age of six.
In Kerala, unsurprisingly, the conditional probability of entering school is not
found to vary significantly as children get older. In Model 3, there is evidence that this
probability decreases with age (up to 8 years but not beyond) but no gender differences
in this probability are found.
In UP however, there are significant changes to the probability of entry as the
children get older. The probability of entry at age 6 is significantly smaller for girls
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relative to boys (the coefficient on ‘girl’ dummy). In Models 1 and 2, the probability of
school entry is found to increase with age for both genders before it flattens out and
becomes insignificant after age 8-9 years. In contrast, the probability for girls is only
significantly different (and lower) in the 8-9 years age group. Model 3, by contrast,
indicates an inverted U-shaped hazard for boys wherein the probability of going to
school first increases between 6-7 years but decreases thereafter. For girls in UP, on the
other hand, even in Model 3, the probability of going to school keeps decreasing and
then becomes insignificant. Thus, our preferred Model 3 leads us to conclude that if
children are not in school by 7 years in UP, then the probability that they will enrol
keeps decreasing.
In AP, models 1 and 2 show a significant decrease in the probability of school
entry only between 8-9 years and 9-10 years. For girls, the probability decreases a little
earlier (7-8 years). Model 3 indicates that the probability of school entry for boys first
increases (up to 7-8 years) and then decreases significantly. For girls, the only
significant conditional probability relative to those of boys is at 7-8 years. Thus, in
conclusion, the longer the children stay out of school in AP, the less likely they will
enter school. In addition, there are no gender differences in the conditional probability
of school entry in AP.
These results are consistent with the fact that in the initial years, many children
are not sent to school because their parents have other priorities so that a delay of a year
or two in schooling is not seen as very significant. However, as parents recognise that
time is passing and they need to send their children to school, the school entry
probabilities increase at the beginning but, beyond a certain age, only the more difficult
cases remain and parents may simply decide that it is ‘too late’. Our results also seem to
confirm that the norm for schooling is very strong in Kerala and the lack of variation in
school starting ages.
6.3 Autonomy variables and other female characteristics (equations (5)(7))
Our preferred model is Model 3 where we assume that the answers given to a set of
nineteen questions (see Appendix 1) are fallible measures of unobserved underlying
sub-spheres of autonomy. In this model, we also allow the overall concept of female
autonomy to be correlated with female characteristics. The estimated associations are
reported in Table 9. Since the autonomy variable is set to have zero mean, the reference
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case in this model is assigned a value of 0 for ‘autonomy’. Additionally, for
identification purposes, the effect of a mother belonging to scheduled caste was set
equal to (positive) one. Hence, all estimated effects are to be interpreted with respect to
the effect of this variable. As one would expect more educated women to be more
autonomous, the positive sign of the education variable indicates that the estimated
effects of all the other covariates are correctly signed.
Overall the estimated results are mixed and vary across the three states. For
Kerala, the only significant correlation with autonomy appears to be for female
education. Furthermore, there are no significant differences in female autonomy across
cohorts, except for women born in the most recent cohort (the youngest) who have the
least autonomy. This is not surprising because they are young and are likely to be less
confident. Also, they may have to answer both to husbands and mothers-in-law.
In contrast to Kerala, for UP and AP, many of the female characteristics are
found to be significantly correlated with autonomy. Caste and education play an
important role in shaping women’s autonomy in both states. Women belonging to
scheduled tribes and other backward castes have greater autonomy relative to women
from ‘forward’ castes (which is the base category). Education is positively correlated
with autonomy. Muslim women have more autonomy than others and rural women have
less autonomy than urban women in both states. Generally, older women are found to
have more autonomy, as expected. These results emphasise the importance of allowing
for the correlation between female autonomy and other characteristics of the woman
and the household as we have done in Model 3.
Our specification in Model 3 allows us to estimate the interrelations between the
four sub-spheres of autonomy and their overarching concept. In the present model every
sub-sphere is regressed on the overall concept of female autonomy. Results for this are
in Table 10. For Kerala the influence on the sub-spheres does not appear strong. All the
estimates are insignificant. In UP and AP, by contrast, the estimated factor loadings
vary between the various sub-spheres. In AP, we find that female autonomy has a
positive, significant effect on both decision-making autonomy and emotional autonomy.
In UP, on the other hand, female autonomy appears to have a positive influence on
emotional autonomy and a negative effect on decision-making autonomy relative to its
effect on economic autonomy which is assigned a value of 1 (for identification
purposes). A tentative interpretation of these results is strategic interaction between the
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spouses. More precisely: it might be the case that the woman trades off one sphere
against the other. It may be the case, for instance, that she values emotional autonomy
more than decision-making autonomy. In such a case she might renounce bargaining
power on one set of issues in order to increase her say on another set. As a result female
autonomy influences decision-making negatively and emotional autonomy positively.
These interactions could be the focus of further research.
Overall, the heterogeneity exhibited by the results in this sub-section is
noteworthy and emphasises the complexity of the concept of female autonomy. The fact
that the correlations between the explanatory variables and the four sub-spheres varies
to such an extent is particularly telling. This finding must suggest that a plethora of
factors and strategic interactions lies behind the autonomy of a woman, further
highlighting the importance of more research in this area.
6.4 Effects of other covariates on school entry probabilities
Our results to Model 3 (see Appendix Table A2.2) indicate that scheduled tribe children
are less likely to enrol in school in both Kerala and AP. In UP, both scheduled caste and
other backward caste children are less likely to enter into school, while it is scheduled
tribes and other backward castes that are less likely to go to school in AP. Muslim
children, similarly, are less likely to go to school in both AP and UP though in Kerala,
this effect is not significant. We have already seen that mother’s education influences
female autonomy and through this affects school entry age. Our results indicate that
mother’s education also has a direct significant positive effect on the hazard of the child
entering school in both Kerala and AP though this effect is variable across models in
UP. This direct effect is largest and most significant in Kerala. Father’s education is
also highly significant and this is true for both primary and secondary education, though
the size of the latter effect is smaller.
Wealth has almost no significant effect on school entry age in Kerala (as one
might expect) but it is significant in UP, particularly in the top quintile and especially so
in AP in all quintiles. It is clear that the probability of school entry is higher for the 5th
wealth quintile than the first in all the models for both AP and UP. The conditional
probability of a child entering school is higher in rural areas in UP and AP than in urban
areas, which is rather surprising given that there are more alternative uses of children’s
time in farming regions.
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The birth order of the indexed child has no impact in Kerala and slightly
increases the probability of school entry for the second born child in AP. However, in
UP, children born second or third show significantly lower probabilities of entering into
school than firstborn children. Contrary to this, our results to model 3 indicate that the
influence of the birth order being three or above in UP on the hazard is positive and
significant implying that while the probability of school entry decreases for 2nd and 3rd
born children, it increases for children lower down the birth order. Furthermore, girls
appear to be significantly less likely to enrol in school in UP and significantly more
likely to enrol in AP. With regard to the initial conditions, we find these to be entirely
insignificant in Kerala but highly significant in UP. Children who were 6 years in 2003
were more likely to go to school in UP whereas those who were 6 years in 2005 were
less likely to go to school. In AP, children who were 6 years in 2004 and 2005 were less
likely to go to school. As discussed earlier, the hazards are also significant in UP and
AP but not in Kerala.
We can conclude that very few factors, other than parent’s education, influence
child school entry age in Kerala. On the other hand, in AP and UP, socio-economic
characteristics of the household and demographic characteristics of the child as well as
initial conditions play a significant role in determining the age of entry of the child into
school. This leads us to conclude that schooling is a ‘norm’ in Kerala and given this,
and its consequent lack of variability, there is very little that influences it. It is less of a
norm in AP and UP.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
As indicated earlier, female autonomy is an end in itself but also a means to better
welfare outcomes within the home. Our results in this paper indicate that mother’s
education is crucial in all three states, both in influencing female autonomy and also in
influencing the school starting age of children. Using mother’s education as a proxy for
autonomy in the outcome equation, as a number of previous papers have done, would
therefore obscure at least part of this picture. The methodology used in this paper
enables us to separate the direct effects of important covariates on autonomy from the
effects on the outcome of interest conditional on autonomy.
Our more detailed analysis offers greater insight into the role played by female
autonomy in influencing school entry in Kerala and AP/UP. First, female autonomy is
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unaffected by the socio-economic characteristics of the woman or her family in Kerala.
The only exception is female education which positively influences female autonomy in
all three states. This confirms that female autonomy is a ‘norm’ in Kerala, one that is
experienced by women of different characteristics. This is in contrast to AP and UP
where almost all the socio-economic characteristics (caste, religion, birth cohort, rural
abode) influence female autonomy. In UP, for instance, maternal autonomy depends
heavily upon the socio-economic characteristics of the woman indicating that while
women from some groups with certain socio-economic characteristics may enjoy
autonomy in UP, others do not.
Our second main finding in this paper is that, like female autonomy, starting
school at the prescribed age of 6 years is also more of a norm in Kerala. It is not
affected by female autonomy or by other household characteristics, except by the level
of education of parents. In AP and UP, on the other hand, the school starting age is
significantly affected by female autonomy levels, caste, religion, wealth and initial
conditions. These results indicate that while children from some families in these states
start school at the prescribed age, others do not. It is therefore not surprising that the
school starting age window is much longer in AP and UP than in Kerala and that right
censoring is also more prevalent in UP than in Kerala.
From the point of view of policy, our results therefore indicate that in states like
Kerala much less remains to be done with regard to both maternal autonomy and school
entry than in states like AP and UP. In the latter, an attempt to target families with
certain household characteristics could help to simultaneously improve both female
autonomy and school outcomes. The fact that female autonomy is an outcome variable
in its own right and is also an important input into schooling outcomes reinforces the
significance of our results for policy. The importance of schooling, in its turn, is borne
out by the fact that the one variable that is significant in all three states in influencing
both female autonomy and child education is the parent’s education. The estimated
average partial effects of maternal education on the probability of children enrolling in
school were: 0.03 for AP and Kerala, and 0.11 for UP. Given the average enrolment
rate at age 6 of 0.57 for UP, an increase of 0.11 points is a very large increase. This
reiterates the point that educating current generations is therefore crucial for the well-
being of future generations.
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Figure 1: Path Diagram
Notes: (i) Path diagram represents workings of our statistical model given in equations (4)-(7). (ii)
m1 to m19 refer to Female Autonomy measurements laid out in Appendix 1. (iii) Squares refer to
observed variables and circles to latent variables. (iv) Single-headed arrows refer to coefficients or
factor loadings, double-headed arrows to correlations; (v) district d, family j and child i refer to
clusters at district, mother and child levels.
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Table 1
Distribution of Starting school age, percentages
Age When School Started
6 7 8 9 10 11 Censored Observations
STATES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
All India 70 10 4 1 0.3 0.02 14
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 81 8 2 0.2 0.04 - 9
Bihar 35 14 8 3 1 0.1 38
Gujarat 85 6 2 0.2 0.2 - 7
Haryana 77 8 2 1 0.2 - 12
Karnataka 84 7 1 0.5 0.2 0.1 7
Kerala 97 2 0.1 0.3 - - 0.7
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 69 10 4 1 0.3 - 15
Maharashtra 85 7 2 0.4 0.03 - 5
Orissa 80 7 3 1 - - 10
Punjab 73 13 4 0.7 0.2 - 10
Rajasthan 63 11 5 1 0.3 - 19
Tamil Nadu (TN) 96 2 1 - - - 1
West Bengal (WB) 63 15 7 2 0.2 - 14
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 57 14 7 2 0.4 0.02 19
North Eastern States (NE) 64 12 6 2 0.4 0.1 17
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,
Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) Columns [1]-[6]: children entered school at age 6, 7, …, 11; Column [7]: children never having attended school.
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Table 2
Educational Attainments of Children and the Parents in Percentages
CHILDREN MOTHER MOTHER’S HUSBAND
STATES
Never
attended
School Entered Advanced Repeating
Dropped
out
Never
Attended
Primary
Education
Secondary
Education
Tertiary
Education
Never
Attended
Primary
Education
Secondary
Education
Tertiary
Education
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
All India 13 7 76 2 1 47 16 31 6 26 19 44 11
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 8 4 85 1 1 46 14 34 6 31 18 39 12
Bihar 36 13 49 0.2 1 72 8 17 2 40 11 37 11
Gujarat 6 2 85 5 1 46 15 33 6 21 20 50 9
Haryana 10 6 81 2 0.2 58 12 27 3 26 12 54 8
Karnataka 6 7 82 1 1 49 14 34 4 30 20 40 9
Kerala 1 5 93 1 0.3 3 11 71 16 3 17 68 12
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 13 8 75 2 1 57 15 21 7 30 20 36 14
Maharashtra 5 7 86 1 0.5 28 16 46 10 14 19 52 15
Orissa 9 5 81 3 1 52 21 24 3 32 26 32 8
Punjab 9 8 80 1 1 40 16 38 6 25 14 53 8
Rajasthan 18 8 71 1 1 77 9 10 4 38 17 35 9
Tamil Nadu (TN) 1 3 96 1 0.1 27 28 37 8 17 28 46 10
West Bengal (WB) 14 10 72 3 1 48 20 27 6 34 22 34 9
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 18 10 69 2 1 69 10 16 6 31 16 42 11
North Eastern States (NE) 15 6 74 3 0.3 36 20 39 5 23 20 46 11
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland,
Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) Column [1]: child has never attended school; Column [2]: child has entered school at the beginning of the academic year April 2005; Column [3]: child has
advanced to the next grade at the beginning of the academic year April 2005; Column [4]: child did not advance to the next grade at the beginning of the academic year April 2005 and must repeat year;
Column [5]: child dropped out of school at the beginning of the academic year April 2005; Column [6]: mother has never attended school; Column [7]: mother has either incomplete primary education
or complete primary education; Column [8]: mother has either incomplete secondary education or complete secondary education; Column [9]: mother has tertiary education; Column [10]: mother’s
husband has never attended school; Column [11]: mother’s husband has either incomplete primary education or complete primary education; Column [12]: mother’s husband has either incomplete
secondary education or complete secondary education; Column [13]: mother’s husband has tertiary education.
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Table 3
Economic Autonomy, Percentages [State Ranks]
Woman decides on Woman has money
husband's money for own use
STATES [1] [2]
All India 71 [8] 45 [7]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 56 [16] 59 [4]
Bihar 71 [8] 63 [2]
Gujarat 69 [11] 60 [3]
Haryana 74 [5] 35 [10]
Karnataka 58 [15] 59 [4]
Kerala 61 [13] 22 [15]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 72 [6] 47 [4]
Maharashtra 76 [3] 44 [8]
Orissa 70 [10] 38 [9]
Punjab 72 [6] 28 [13]
Rajasthan 62 [12] 33 [11]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 78 [2] 24 [14]
West Bengal (WB) 58 [14] 38 [9]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 80 [1] 65 [1]
North Eastern States (NE) 76 [3] 33 [11]
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the
beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) Column [1]: Woman
decides either herself or jointly with her husband on what to do with husband’s money;
Column [2]: woman has money for her own that she alone can decide how to use.
Table 4
Decision-Making Autonomy, Percentages [State Ranks]
Woman decides on Woman decides on Woman decides on Woman decides on
own health care small household large household visiting family
purchases purchases and friends
STATES [1] [2] [3] [4]
All India 70 [7] 68 [6] 60 [6] 67 [8]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 64 [10] 62 [12] 55 [11] 65 [10]
Bihar 61 [11] 69 [5] 60 [6] 63 [11]
Gujarat 61 [11] 72 [4] 56 [9] 73 [4]
Haryana 73 [4] 64 [10] 56 [9] 72 [6]
Karnataka 51 [16] 57 [14] 51 [14] 55 [14]
Kerala 75 [3] 67 [8] 62 [5] 78 [2]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 57 [14] 63 [11] 56 [10] 56 [13]
Maharashtra 68 [8] 75 [3] 65 [2] 75 [3]
Orissa 67 [9] 66 [9] 60 [6] 67 [8]
Punjab 76 [2] 59 [13] 50 [13] 69 [7]
Rajasthan 54 [15] 56 [15] 46 [15] 47 [16]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 72 [5] 77 [2] 64 [3] 73 [4]
West Bengal (WB) 61 [11] 50 [16] 41 [16] 51 [15]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 72 [5] 68 [6] 64 [3] 61 [12]
North Eastern States (NE) 79 [1] 78 [1] 73 [1] 81 [1]
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year
April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii)
Column [1]: woman decides alone or jointly with husband on own health care; Column [2]: woman decides alone or jointly
with husband on small household purchases; Column [3]: woman decides alone or jointly with husband on large household
purchases; Column [4]: woman decides alone or jointly with husband on visiting family and friends.
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Table 5
Physical Autonomy, Percentages [State Ranks]
Woman can go Woman can go Woman can go
to the market to places outside to health facility
the community
STATES [1] [2] [3]
All India 91 [8] 94 [9] 97 [7]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 87 [12] 95 [7] 97 [7]
Bihar 90 [11] 88 [14] 97 [7]
Gujarat 97 [2] 96 [4] 97 [7]
Haryana 95 [6] 88 [14] 97 [7]
Karnataka 81 [14] 99 [1] 99 [1]
Kerala 80 [15] 85 [15] 94 [15]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 97 [2] 98 [2] 98 [3]
Maharashtra 91 [8] 90 [12] 94 [15]
Orissa 86 [13] 96 [4] 98 [3]
Punjab 97 [2] 90 [12] 98 [3]
Rajasthan 98 [1] 98 [2] 99 [1]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 97 [2] 93 [10] 97 [7]
West Bengal (WB) 80 [15] 91 [11] 96 [14]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 91 [8] 95 [7] 97 [7]
North Eastern States (NE) 95 [6] 96 [4] 98 [3]
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the
beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) Column [1]: woman is
allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to the market; Column [2]: woman is
allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to places outside the community. Column
[3]: woman is allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to a health facility.
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Table 6
Emotional Autonomy, Percentages [State Ranks]
STATES
Woman believes
her husband is not
justified beating her
if she goes out
without telling him
Woman believes her
husband is not
justified beating her
if she neglects the
house and children
Woman believes her
husband is not
justified beating her
if she argues with
him
Woman believes her
husband is not
justified beating her
if she refuses sex
Woman believes
her husband is
not justified
beating her if she
burns the food
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
All India 67 [6] 60 [9] 66 [6] 82 [7] 81 [5]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 55 [14] 50 [13] 61 [11] 72 [15] 73 [10]
Bihar 75 [4] 79 [1] 66 [6] 85 [4] 82 [2]
Gujarat 62 [11] 55 [11] 55 [16] 74 [13] 66 [16]
Haryana 63 [8] 67 [5] 64 [8] 73 [14] 73 [10]
Karnataka 53 [15] 46 [14] 61 [11] 67 [16] 69 [15]
Kerala 63 [8] 55 [11] 73 [4] 83 [5] 78 [8]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 79 [2] 78 [2] 75 [2] 89 [2] 82 [2]
Maharashtra 79 [2] 64 [7] 74 [3] 82 [7] 80 [6]
Orissa 57 [13] 56 [10] 57 [14] 82 [7] 73 [10]
Punjab 67 [6] 64 [7] 64 [8] 76 [12] 75 [9]
Rajasthan 63 [8] 65 [6] 61 [11] 83 [5] 72 [13]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 51 [16] 37 [16] 56 [15] 81 [10] 71 [14]
West Bengal (WB) 81 [1] 74 [3] 76 [1] 86 [3] 87 [1]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 75 [4] 72 [4] 72 [5] 90 [1] 82 [2]
North Eastern States
(NE) 60 [12] 44 [15] 64 [8] 81 [10] 80 [6]
STATES
Woman believes
her husband is not
justified beating
her if she is
unfaithful
Woman believes
her husband is not
justified beating
her if she is
disrespectful
Woman believes
she is justified
refusing sex if
husband has other
women
Woman believes
she is justified
refusing sex if
husband has
sexually
transmitted disease
Woman believes
she is justified
refusing sex if
she is tired
[6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
All India 69 [9] 54 [10] 81 [8] 82 [7] 80 [4]
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 57 [15] 47 [13] 80 [10] 78 [11] 77 [10]
Bihar 72 [6] 65 [1] 91 [1] 86 [4] 80 [4]
Gujarat 63 [10] 55 [8] 74 [13] 77 [12] 69 [16]
Haryana 61 [12] 57 [6] 87 [4] 83 [6] 79 [6]
Karnataka 57 [15] 43 [16] 82 [7] 79 [9] 78 [8]
Kerala 76 [4] 56 [7] 75 [11] 76 [13] 72 [15]
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 72 [6] 62 [3] 91 [1] 92 [1] 92 [1]
Maharashtra 80 [3] 58 [5] 71 [15] 75 [14] 75 [13]
Orissa 60 [13] 47 [13] 56 [16] 75 [14] 76 [11]
Punjab 58 [14] 55 [8] 85 [5] 85 [5] 79 [6]
Rajasthan 70 [8] 51 [11] 91 [1] 92 [1] 87 [3]
Tamil Nadu (TN) 85 [1] 51 [11] 73 [14] 79 [9] 78 [8]
West Bengal (WB) 84 [2] 65 [1] 75 [11] 69 [16] 75 [13]
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 74 [5] 62 [3] 85 [5] 88 [3] 89 [2]
North Eastern States
(NE) 62 [11] 44 [15] 81 [8] 82 [7] 76 [11]
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year
April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii)
The answers to the questions are binary indicators as explained in Appendix 1.
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Table 7
Traditional Female Autonomy Indices, Means (Standard Deviation)
[State Ranks]
Economic Dec-Making Physical Emotional Female Female
Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy Autonomy
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Median
(S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.)
(Interquartile
Range)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All India 1.2 [4] 2.6 [5] 2.8 [7] 7.2 [7] 13.8 [6] 14 [5]
(0.7) (1.5) (0.5) (2.6) (3.5) (5.0)
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 1.1 [8] 2.5 [11] 2.8 [7] 6.4 [14] 12.8 [15] 13 [13]
(0.7) (1.7) (0.6) (3.0) (4.0) (6.0)
Bihar 1.3 [2] 2.5 [11] 2.8 [7] 7.8 [3] 14.5 [3] 15 [1]
(0.7) (1.5) (0.6) (2.3) (3.3) (5.0)
Gujarat 1.3 [2] 2.6 [5] 2.9 [2] 6.7 [12] 13.5 [9] 14 [5]
(0.7) (1.4) (0.5) (2.9) (3.9) (6.0)
Haryana 1.1 [8] 2.6 [5] 2.8 [7] 7.2 [7] 13.7 [7] 14 [5]
(0.6) (1.5) (0.6) (3.0) (3.8) (6.0)
Karnataka 1.2 [4] 2.1 [14] 2.8 [7] 6.4 [14] 12.5 [16] 13 [13]
(0.7) (1.6) (0.5) (2.7) (3.7) (5.0)
Kerala 0.8 [16] 2.8 [3] 2.6 [16] 7.1 [10] 13.4 [11] 14 [5]
(0.7) (1.4) (0.8) (2.4) (3.3) (5.0)
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 1.2 [4] 2.3 [13] 2.9 [2] 8.2 [1] 14.6 [2] 15 [1]
(0.7) (1.6) (0.4) (2.3) (3.5) (6.0)
Maharashtra 1.2 [4] 2.8 [3] 2.7 [14] 7.5 [5] 14.3 [4] 15 [1]
(0.7) (1.4) (0.7) (2.5) (3.5) (5.0)
Orissa 1.1 [8] 2.6 [5] 2.8 [7] 6.4 [14] 12.9 [14] 13 [13]
(0.7) (1.5) (0.5) (2.9) (3.8) (6.0)
Punjab 1 [12] 2.6 [5] 2.9 [2] 7.2 [7] 13.6 [8] 14 [5]
(0.6) (1.4) (0.5) (2.7) (3.5) (6.0)
Rajastan 1 [12] 2 [15] 3 [1] 7.3 [6] 13.3 [13] 13 [13]
(0.7) (1.6) (0.3) (2.6) (3.5) (5.0)
Tamil Nadu (TN) 1 [12] 2.9 [2] 2.9 [2] 6.6 [13] 13.4 [11] 14 [5]
(0.6) (1.4) (0.5) (2.3) (3.0) (4.0)
West Bengal (WB) 1 [12] 2 [15] 2.7 [14] 7.8 [3] 13.5 [9] 14 [5]
(0.7) (1.6) (0.7) (2.6) (3.8) (6.0)
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 1.4 [1] 2.6 [5] 2.8 [7] 7.9 [2] 14.8 [1] 15 [1]
(0.7) (1.5) (0.6) (2.4) (3.3) (4.0)
North Eastern States 1.1 [8] 3.1 [1] 2.9 [2] 6.8 [11] 13.9 [5] 14 [5]
(0.6) (1.4) (0.4) (2.5) (3.2) (4.0)
Notes: (i) The percentages are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year
April 2005. (ii) The North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii)
Column [1]: sum of dummy variables based on questions laid out in Table 4; Column [2]: sum of dummy variables based on
questions laid out in Table 5; Column [3]: sum of dummy variables based on questions laid out in Table 6; Column [4]: sum
of dummy variables based on questions laid out in Table 7; Column [5]: addition of indices reported in Columns [1], [2], [3]
and [4].
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Table 8
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Conditional Probability of Entry into School: Main Coefficients from Models 1, 2, 2a and 3 (Standard Error)
AP KERALA UP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Female Autonomy - -0.044 0.024 -0.026 0.327 0.312 0.001 0.007 -0.017 1.315***
(0.098) (0.075) (0.076) (0.281) (0.250) (0.032) (0.052) (0.035) (0.066)
Female Autonomy * Girl - 0.130 0.078 0.206* -0.048 -0.057 -0.002 0.051 0.028 0.082***
(0.132) (0.106) (0.122) (0.389) (0.358) (0.045) (0.066) (0.048) (0.026)
Baseline Hazard:
Age Interval 6-7 0.040 0.028 -0.826 -1.053*** -0.694 -0.722 -1.255 -1.577** 0.410*** 0.398*** -0.353*** -0.784***
(0.467) (0.414) (0.529) (0.167) (1.155) (1.207) (0.852) (0.652) (0.150) (0.149) (0.113) (0.077)
Age Interval 7-8 0.392 0.366 -0.639 -1.014*** -2.041 -2.002 -2.592* -2.854** 1.442*** 1.423*** 0.239 -0.283***
(0.763) (0.676) (0.875) (0.280) (1.724) (1.708) (1.430) (1.267) (0.226) (0.223) (0.180) (0.104)
Age Interval 8-9 -1.936** -1.966** -2.931*** -3.291*** 1.378 1.465 0.896 0.665 1.817*** 1.794*** 0.335 -0.317**
(0.894) (0.820) (0.983) (0.495) (1.774) (1.798) (1.523) (1.347) (0.300) (0.297) (0.242) (0.154)
Age Interval 9-10 -2.680** -2.719** -3.695*** -4.040*** - - - - 0.582 0.555 -0.962** -1.816***
(1.326) (1.271) (1.388) (1.038) (0.504) (0.502) (0.454) (0.407)
Age Interval 10-11 - - - - - - - - 1.252 1.227 -0.427 -1.340
(1.241) (1.239) (1.191) (1.188)
Baseline Hazard * Girl:
Age Interval 6-7 -0.313 -0.315 -0.250 -0.283 2.011 1.987 1.858 1.818 0.077 0.077 0.069 0.232**
(0.301) (0.299) (0.274) (0.257) (1.427) (1.421) (1.375) (1.351) (0.132) (0.132) (0.113) (0.112)
Age Interval 7-8 -2.049*** -2.044*** -1.995*** -1.940*** - - - - -0.035 -0.036 -0.080 0.040
(0.585) (0.581) (0.574) (0.539) (0.171) (0.170) (0.149) (0.149)
Age Interval 8-9 - - - - - - - - -0.785*** -0.784*** -0.726*** -0.607***
(0.256) (0.255) (0.232) (0.233)
Age Interval 9-10 - - - - - - - - 0.406 0.410 0.415 0.753
(0.542) (0.541) (0.510) (0.512)
Age Interval 10-11 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Girl 0.447*** 0.450*** 0.367*** 0.454*** 0.239 0.190 0.134 0.225 -0.192** -0.189** -0.112* -0.451***
(0.162) (0.158) (0.131) (0.124) (0.422) (0.438) (0.401) (0.371) (0.081) (0.080) (0.059) (0.072)
Constant 1.584*** 1.616*** 1.025*** 0.695*** 1.915 2.017 1.630 1.587 -0.741*** -0.740*** -0.515*** 1.212***
(0.483) (0.485) (0.346) (0.032) (1.469) (1.550) (1.079) (0.852) (0.222) (0.220) (0.153) (0.020)
Variance of the Mother
Level Random Effect
1.772***
(0.340)
1.789***
(0.335) - -
1.080
(0.933)
1.103
(1.097) - -
1.508***
(0.106)
1.500***
(0.104) - -
Number of mothers 1.737 1.737 1.737 1.737 842 842 842 842 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160
Number of children 2.419 2.419 2.419 2.419 1.051 1.051 1.051 1.051 6.510 6.510 6.510 6.510
Log Likelihood 1321.17 -1320.66 -1347.59 -26907.18 -149.95 -148.34 -148.78 -502.34 -6402.17 -6230.47 -6401.99 -30501.09
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year April 2005. (ii) the dependent variable is the dummy whether child enters
school and the reference case for the baseline hazard is the normal entry at age 6. (iii) Model 1: duration specification without female autonomy variable; Model 2: duration specification with female
autonomy indices, Model 3: structural equation model specification. (iv) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; (v) Log likelihood values for Model 3 are not comparable to the other Model values. (vi) ---
coefficient estimates too small to report. (vii) The remaining coefficient estimates are reported in Appendix 2 Table A2.2.
41
Table 9
Estimates of the Regression of Female Autonomy
on Female Characteristics, Equation 5 (Standard Errors)
FEMALE AUTONOMY AP KERALA UP
Ma: Belongs to Schleduled Caste 1 1 1
Ma: Belongs to Scheduled Tribe 0.705*** -0.265 1.634***
(0.198) (0.674) (0.587)
Ma: Belongs to Other Backw. Caste 0.630*** 0.101 0.104***
(0.104) (0.256) (0.037)
Ma: Muslim 0.737*** -0.165 0.487***
(0.136) (0.209) (0.106)
Ma: Completed Primary Educ or More 0.559*** 1.439*** 0.387***
(0.100) (0.563) (0.101)
Ma: Birth Cohort 1968 – 1972 -0.933*** 0.184 -1.056***
(0.173) (0.398) (0.298)
Ma: Birth Cohort 1973 – 1977 -0.713*** -0.376 -1.745***
(0.149) (0.465) (0.309)
Ma: Birth Cohort 1978 – 1982 -1.140*** -0.096 -1.569***
(0.131) (0.167) (0.349)
Ma: Birth Cohort 1983 – 1991 -1.321*** -0.598*** -1.834***
(0.151) (0.101) (0.509)
Rural -0.575*** 0.108 -0.634***
(0.106) (0.283) (0.101)
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic year April
2005. (ii) Correlations between the scheduled caste dummy and the spheres have been set to one for identification. (iv) *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 10
Estimates of Regression of Sub-Spheres on Female Autonomy (Standard Error)
Dependent Variable: AP KERALA UP
Economic Autonomy 1 1 1
Decision-Making Autonomy 0.863*** 0.298 -0.734***
(0.024) (0.252) (0.101)
Physical Autonomy 0.124** 0.044 0.108
(0.061) (0.098) (0.198)
Emotional Autonomy 1.627*** 0.356 0.451***
(0.041) (0.305) (0.102)
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the
academic year April 2005. (ii) Estimates are derived from Regression of sub-spheres on concept of female
autonomy (8). (iii) Coefficient of female autonomy on economic autonomy has been set equal to one for
identification (iv) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 11
Simulated Cumulative School Enrolment Probabilities
AP Kerala UP
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Autonomy = 0
Autonomy =
mean + 2 std dev Autonomy = 0
Autonomy =
mean + 2 std dev Autonomy = 0
Autonomy =
mean + 2 std dev
Age 6 0.821 0.825 0.994 0.997 0.587 0.607
Age 7 0.896 0.897 0.994 0.998 0.689 0.710
Age 8 0.920 0.921 0.994 0.999 0.775 0.796
Age 9 0.921 0.922 0.996 0.999 0.809 0.830
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of the academic
year April 2005. (ii) Simulations based on Model 3 (Structural Equation Model).(iii) All covariates are evaluated at
their sample means. (iv) In columns [1], [3] and [5] latent factor of female autonomy is evaluated at zero (which
corresponds to the mean) (v) In columns [2], [4] and [6] the latent factor of female autonomy is evaluated at two
(which corresponds to a two standard deviation increase from the mean).
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Appendices:
Appendix 1
1. Economic Autonomy:
 m1: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either herself or jointly with her husband on what to
do with her husband’s money.
 m2: takes the value of 1 if the woman has money of her own that she alone can decide how to use.
2. Physical Autonomy:
 m3: takes the value of 1 if the woman is allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to the
market.
 m4: takes the value of 1 if the woman is allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to the
health clinic.
 m5: takes the value of 1 if the woman is allowed to go alone or jointly with someone else to places
outside the community.
3. Decision-making Autonomy:
 m6: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either alone or jointly with her husband on her own
health care.
 m7: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either alone or jointly with her husband on small
household purchases.
 m8: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either alone or jointly with her husband on large
household purchases.
 m9: takes the value of 1 if the woman decides either alone or jointly with her husband on visiting
family and friends.
4. Emotional Autonomy:
 m10: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she argues
with him.
 m11: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she is
disrespectful.
 m12: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she goes
out without telling him.
 m13: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if he
suspects her of being unfaithful.
 m14: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she
neglects house or children.
 m15: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she
refuses to have sex with him.
 m16: takes the value of 1 if woman believes her husband is not justified in beating her if she does
not cook the food properly.
 m17: takes the value of 1 if the woman believes she is justified in refusing sex if husband has
sexually transmitted disease.
 m18: takes the value of 1 if the woman believes she is justified in refusing sex if husband has other
women.
 m19: takes the value of 1 if the woman believes she is justified in refusing sex if she is tired.
44
The Outcome Model – linear predictor for mother j (equation (7))
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Notes: The variables 11 to 410 are the linear predictors for the binary indicators associated with the measurements m1 to m19
laid out above.
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Appendix 2
Table A2.1
Logistic Regression for the Probability of Dropping out of Primary School
Coefficient Estimates (Standard Errors)
Variable Urban Rural No. of
Children
No. of
Mothers
States Urban Rural No. of
Children
No. of
Mothers
All India SSA 0.257*** 0.138*** 41,282 28,610 Maharashtra 0.371*** 0.318*** 4,691 2,147
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
SSA*girl 0.017 0.046*** 0.088** 0.083*
(0.286) (0.001) (0.013) (0.064)
AP SSA -0.136 0.148 3,519 1,728 Orissa 0.407*** 0.281*** 2,267 1,017
(0.383) (0.180) (0.002) (0.001)
SSA*girl -0.011 0.174*** 0.009 -0.009
(0.856) (0.001) (0.859) (0.799)
Bihar SSA -0.203 0.204* 2,325 808 Punjab 0.694** 0.251** 2,191 952
(0.523) (0.069) (0.047) (0.042)
SSA*girl -0.102 -0.005 -0.173 0.107*
(0.545) (0.913) (0.203) (0.051)
Gujarat SSA 0.365** 0.0952 2,019 889 Rajasthan 0.365** 0.116 2,665 1,008
(0.023) (0.434) (0.020) (0.159)
SSA*girl 0.045 0.105** 0.092 0.109***
(0.502) (0.045) (0.201) (0.005)
Haryana SSA -0.0339 0.323** 1,861 769 TN 0.506*** 0.260* 2,532 1,349
(0.916) (0.011) (0.008) (0.079)
SSA*girl -0.111 0.068 0.066 0.175**
(0.499) (0.283) (0.360) (0.013)
Karnataka SSA 0.365 0.0437 2,894 1,359 WB 0.797*** 0.384*** 3,289 1,629
(0.104) (0.781) (0.001) (0.001)
SSA*girl 0.034 0.101* 0.008 -0.130***
(0.705) (0.094) (0.925) (0.005)
Kerala SSA 1.240* 0.848*** 1,479 815 UP 0.228*** 0.0747 8,390 2,848
(0.065) (0.005) (0.002) (0.168)
SSA*girl -0.326 -0.009 0.0277 0.036
(0.213) (0.944) (0.459) (0.160)
MP SSA 0.295* 0.192* 3,662 1,531 NE 0.366*** 0.233*** 10,331 4,150
(0.096) (0.076) (0.001) (0.001)
SSA*girl 0.038 0.110** -0.074 0.042
(0.594) (0.018) (0.182) (0.139)
Notes: (i) The above model is estimated using the sample of children aged 6-11 at the interview time. SSA is the actual School-Starting
Age and SSA*girl refers to the interaction with the gender dummy. (ii) North-Eastern states are: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland,
Manipur, Mizoram and Meghalaya. (iii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A2.2
Estimates of Remaining Coefficients from Models [1], [2] and [3]
(Standard Error)
AP KERALA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Female Autonomy - -0.044 0.024 -0.026 0.327 0.312 0.001
(0.098) (0.075) (0.076) (0.281) (0.250) -0.032
Female Autonomy *
Girl - 0.130 0.078 0.206* -0.048 -0.057 -0.002
(0.132) (0.106) (0.122) (0.389) (0.358) -0.045
Caste:
Scheduled Caste -0.207 -0.205 -0.163 -0.080 -0.526 -0.545 -0.540 -0.401
(0.269) (0.267) (0.214) (0.172) (0.669) (0.661) (0.597) (0.545)
Scheduled Tribe -1.016*** -1.019*** -0.781*** -0.738*** -2.521** -2.494* -2.103** -1.961**
(0.375) (0.365) (0.262) (0.192) (1.262) (1.285) (0.969) (0.818)
Other Backward Caste -0.406* -0.402* -0.336** -0.232* -0.443 -0.443 -0.381 -0.112
(0.224) (0.221) (0.171) (0.130) (0.466) (0.468) (0.422) (0.390)
Religion:
Muslim -0.968*** -0.970*** -0.704*** -0.687*** -0.081 0.035 0.061 0.079
(0.324) (0.302) (0.224) (0.141) (0.503) (0.506) (0.469) (0.444)
Highest Education:
Ma: Completed Prim. 0.385* 0.386* 0.282* 0.283** 1.917*** 1.793*** 1.643*** 1.568***
(0.205) (0.200) (0.149) (0.129) (0.616) (0.602) (0.494) (0.448)
Pa: Completed Prim. 0.373* 0.359* 0.287** 0.272** 1.244** 1.162** 1.057** 1.082**
(0.190) (0.184) (0.135) (0.114) (0.558) (0.540) (0.454) (0.421)
Pa: Completed Sec. 1.202*** 1.194*** 0.960*** 0.989*** 1.952** 1.726* 1.647* 1.516*
(0.353) (0.342) (0.284) (0.240) (0.947) (0.940) (0.887) (0.859)
Wealth:
2nd Quintile 0.415 0.395 0.265 0.366** 0.467 0.520 0.589 0.966
(0.338) (0.333) (0.233) (0.175) (1.317) (1.288) (1.078) (0.774)
3rd Quintile 0.662** 0.641** 0.430* 0.521*** 1.350 1.351 1.222 1.561**
(0.327) (0.320) (0.226) (0.153) (1.306) (1.259) (1.046) (0.736)
4th Quintile 0.698** 0.685** 0.513** 0.561*** 0.370 0.404 0.364 0.725
(0.343) (0.340) (0.240) (0.158) (1.194) (1.159) (0.966) (0.604)
5th Quintile 1.206*** 1.170*** 0.927*** 0.945*** -0.104 -0.113 -0.106 0.180
(0.435) (0.422) (0.312) (0.206) (1.253) (1.219) (1.029) (0.691)
Rural Household 0.443** 0.439** 0.376** 0.393*** -0.405 -0.374 -0.369 -0.230
(0.217) (0.214) (0.168) (0.117) (0.482) (0.467) (0.431) (0.373)
Child Characteristics:
Girl 0.447*** 0.450*** 0.367*** 0.454*** 0.239 0.190 0.134 0.225
(0.162) (0.158) (0.131) (0.124) (0.422) (0.438) (0.401) (0.371)
Birth Order = 2 0.312* 0.306* 0.271* 0.277** 0.272 0.260 0.259 0.217
(0.176) (0.172) (0.146) (0.120) (0.456) (0.456) (0.424) (0.409)
Birth Order = 3 0.234 0.235 0.184 0.208 0.897 0.859 0.840 0.882
(0.192) (0.189) (0.154) (0.136) (0.739) (0.731) (0.671) (0.646)
Birth order > 3 -0.060 -0.058 -0.015 -0.026 1.014 0.950 0.950 0.967
(0.205) (0.203) (0.155) (0.138) (0.768) (0.758) (0.676) (0.625)
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Table A2.2 Continued
AP KERALA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Initial Conditions:
Aged 6 in 2003 -0.172 -0.177 -0.118 -0.131 -0.261 -0.255 -0.213 -0.156
(0.166) (0.165) (0.136) (0.126) (0.506) (0.504) (0.457) (0.435)
Aged 6 in 2004 -0.349** -0.350** -0.264* -0.262** 0.293 0.303 0.290 0.494
(0.178) (0.176) (0.146) (0.132) (0.562) (0.557) (0.514) (0.528)
Aged 6 in 2005 -1.506*** -1.514*** -1.173*** -1.069*** 0.619 0.602 0.553 0.636
(0.380) (0.362) (0.292) (0.199) (1.203) (1.181) (1.100) (1.078)
Baseline Hazard:
Age Interval 6-7 0.040 0.028 -0.826 -1.053*** -0.694 -0.722 -1.255 -1.577**
(0.467) (0.414) (0.529) (0.167) (1.155) (1.207) (0.852) (0.652)
Age Interval 7-8 0.392 0.366 -0.639 -1.014*** -2.041 -2.002 -2.592* -2.854**
(0.763) (0.676) (0.875) (0.280) (1.724) (1.708) (1.430) (1.267)
Age Interval 8-9 -1.936** -1.966** -2.931*** -3.291*** 1.378 1.465 0.896 0.665
(0.894) (0.820) (0.983) (0.495) (1.774) (1.798) (1.523) (1.347)
Age Interval 9-10 -2.680** -2.719** -3.695*** -4.040***
(1.326) (1.271) (1.388) (1.038)
Age Interval 10-11 0 0 0 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Baseline Hazard *
Girl:
Age Interval 6-7 -0.313 -0.315 -0.250 -0.283 2.011 1.987 1.858 1.818
(0.301) (0.299) (0.274) (0.257) (1.427) (1.421) (1.375) (1.351)
Age Interval 7-8 -2.049*** -2.044*** -1.995*** -1.940***
(0.585) (0.581) (0.574) (0.539)
Constant 1.584*** 1.616*** 1.025*** 0.695*** 1.915 2.017 1.630 1.587
(0.483) (0.485) (0.346) (0.032) (1.469) (1.550) (1.079) (0.852)
Mother Level
Random Effect 1.772*** 1.789*** - - 1.080 1.103 - -
(0.340) (0.335) (0.933) (1.097)
Log Likelihood 1321.17 -1320.66 -1347.59 -26907.18 -149.95 -148.34 -148.78 -502.34
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Table A2.2 Continued
UP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Female Autonomy 0.007 -0.017 1.315***
(0.052) (0.035) (0.066)
Female Autonomy * Girl 0.051 0.028 0.082***
(0.066) (0.048) (0.026)
Caste:
Scheduled Caste 0.024 0.019 -0.002 -0.691***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.088) (0.067)
Scheduled Tribe 0.269 0.341 0.393 -1.293***
(0.790) (0.684) (0.282) (0.233)
Other Backward Caste -0.131 -0.132 -0.175** -0.661***
(0.110) (0.109) (0.071) (0.055)
Religion:
Muslim -0.992*** -0.989*** -0.664*** -1.014***
(0.124) (0.124) (0.081) (0.058)
Highest Education:
Ma: Completed Prim. 0.450*** 0.442*** 0.353*** 0.075
(0.115) (0.115) (0.076) (0.071)
Pa: Completed Prim. 0.681*** 0.678*** 0.434*** 0.331***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.061) (0.053)
Pa: Completed Sec. 1.272*** 1.262*** 0.874*** 0.762***
(0.166) (0.166) (0.107) (0.096)
Wealth:
2nd Quintile 0.264** 0.263** 0.224*** -0.107*
(0.116) (0.115) (0.072) (0.062)
3rd Quintile 0.599*** 0.595*** 0.414*** -0.064
(0.137) (0.135) (0.085) (0.071)
4th Quintile 0.610*** 0.605*** 0.475*** -0.145*
(0.151) (0.150) (0.099) (0.077)
5th Quintile 1.680*** 1.668*** 1.180*** 0.229**
(0.211) (0.209) (0.139) (0.103)
Rural Household 0.419*** 0.431*** 0.343*** 0.126**
(0.134) (0.135) (0.095) (0.054)
Child Characteristics:
Girl -0.192** -0.189** -0.112* -0.451***
(0.081) (0.080) (0.059) (0.072)
Birth Order = 2 0.004 0.003 0.034 -0.564***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.078) (0.073)
Birth Order = 3 -0.095 -0.098 -0.052 -0.479***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.080) (0.061)
Birth order > 3 0.030 0.029 0.026 0.373***
(0.100) (0.099) (0.069) (0.061)
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Table A2.2 Continued
UP
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 3
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Initial Conditions:
Aged 6 in 2003 0.760*** 0.755*** 0.525*** 0.479***
(0.097) (0.096) (0.069) (0.071)
Aged 6 in 2004 0.893*** 0.889*** 0.605*** -0.130
(0.109) (0.108) (0.079) (0.127)
Aged 6 in 2005 -0.054 -0.054 -0.019 -0.348***
(0.173) (0.172) (0.130) (0.057)
Baseline Hazard:
Age Interval 6-7 0.410*** 0.398*** -0.353*** -0.784***
(0.150) (0.149) (0.113) (0.077)
Age Interval 7-8 1.442*** 1.423*** 0.239 -0.283***
(0.226) (0.223) (0.180) (0.104)
Age Interval 8-9 1.817*** 1.794*** 0.335 -0.317**
(0.300) (0.297) (0.242) (0.154)
Age Interval 9-10 0.582 0.555 -0.962** -1.816***
(0.504) (0.502) (0.454) (0.407)
Age Interval 10-11 1.252 1.227 -0.427 -1.340
(1.241) (1.239) (1.191) (1.188)
Baseline Hazard * Girl:
Age Interval 6-7 0.077 0.077 0.069 0.232**
(0.132) (0.132) (0.113) (0.112)
Age Interval 7-8 -0.035 -0.036 -0.080 0.040
(0.171) (0.170) (0.149) (0.149)
Age Interval 8-9 -0.785*** -0.784*** -0.726*** -0.607***
(0.256) (0.255) (0.232) (0.233)
Age Interval 9-10 0.406 0.410 0.415 0.753
(0.542) (0.541) (0.510) (0.512)
Age Interval 10-11
Constant -0.741*** -0.740*** -0.515*** 1.212***
(0.222) (0.220) (0.153) (0.020)
Mother Level Random
Effect 1.508*** 1.500*** - -
(0.106) (0.104)
Log Likelihood -6402.17 -6230.47 -6401.99 -30501.09
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on the sample of women with children aged 6-11 at the beginning of
the academic year April 2005. (ii) Model 1: duration specification without female autonomy variable;
Model 2: duration specification with female autonomy indices; Model 3: structural equation model
specification. (iii) Dependent Variable in Columns [1], [2] and [3]: Dummy for child entering school
- SSA; (iv) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. (v) Models allow for unobserved heterogeneity at the
child-, mother- and district-levels.
